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PREFACE
This thesis on General Hans von Seeckt's political idea has three aims.
The first is a presentation of the content of his published works.

Because

there is little aYailable in English concerned with these specific books, they
have been given in as objective and detailed a manner as possible.

This is

also the reason for the biographical section which has tried to present facts
not usually'tound in accounts of his life.
Secondly, though mu.ch has been written about Seeckt's actions, their
interpretation remains to be clarified.

This thesis does not pretend to do so,

but rather it should provide the perspective for such clarification.

It

should also be mentioned that Gordon's excellent study ot the Reichswerh's
relations to the Republic, partly based on Seechkt's private papers, reveals
nothing contradictory to what is contained in his published works.
Thirdly, Seeckt and his ideas have some meaning for the contemporary world
situation.

To draw parallels between his time and our own would not be

difficult.

It is hoped that this presentation may help to focus more sharply

on the relationship of military and political forces in our age of nuclear
weapons.

iii

CHAPTER I

BIOGRAPHICAL

BACKGRO~ID

Ironically the Seeckt coat or arms featured a dove bearing an olive branch
in its beak.

This dove of peace was the symbol or an aristocratic family whic

had left Eastern Europe for Sweden sometime prior to 1700. 1

In 1816 Rudolf vo

Seeckt, the grandfather of Hans and the family's first military member, left
the Swedish

ar~

to join the Prussian army in hopes of rapid promotion in its

reorganization following the Napoleonic Wars. 2 In this he was disappointed but
he stayed on and married Emma Israels,3 whose Italian ancestors had settled in
Pomerania about 1600.

Their son, Richard August, also entered the army and

rose rapidly to the rank of general during the three wars that created
Bismarck's Reich.

Richard married his first cousin, Auguste von Seeckt, whose

~he family's origin was probably Hungarian or perhaps Polish although
Seeckt himself felt his ancestors must have been Nordic and their origin
exclusively Swedish. Friedrich von Rabenau, Hans von Seeckt. Aus meinem Leben
1866-1917 (Leipzig, 1938), p. 14. Also consult Edgar von Schmidt-Paul!, General !2!! Seeckt: Lebensbild ~ Deutschen Soldaten (Berlin, 1937).
2Rabenau prefers not to call the Seeckt family ftJunkers II unless that
Itcatchword" is taken to mean nobility and strength of character. He emphasizes
especially that only the last two generations before Hans represented ~
military tradition. Rabenau, ~ ~ Seeckt, p. 13.
3aabenau carefUlly points out that Israela "is an old Nordic name" and thi
is a reminder of the date of publication and the consequent problem of possible
supression in the use of Seeckt's papers. ~., p. 15.

1

2

first and last boys died in infanoy.
Gratin von Rothkirch unci Trach.

The seoond child, Marie, later became the
On April 22, 1866 was born Hans 4 Friedrich

Leopold, their third child and destined to be the last to bear the name of
Seeckt.
Schleswig in Schleswig-Holstein was Hans' birthplace, but in 1874 his
father was stationed in Berlin.5 Here the young Hans began his life-long
attachment to that city which seemed, he wrote his mother as a young man, to be
6
more his real home than with his relatives. In 1881 the fami~ moved to
Strasbourg where he oompleted his secondary education in 1885 at the Protestant
Gymnasium. His final examinations there revealed his scholastic capabilities
and he would have been able to matriculate. 7 Instead, he decided upon a
career in the military.
After graduation in 1885, at the age of' nineteen, Seeckt entered the elite
Kaiser Alexander Grenadier-Guards Regiment stationed in Berlin.

The follOwing

he was sent. to study at the Hanover tl/ar College, where he was not entire
happy because he felt the discipline was overly strict. 8 In 1893 he was
year

appointed to the liar Academy, from which in 1897 he entered the mobilization

4His actual name was not Johannes but its diminutive Hans, and this he
used throughout his life. Friedrich von Rabenau, Seeckt. Aus Seinem Leben
1918-1936 (Leipzig, 1940), p. 320.
----5Rabenau,
6

~.,

!!!:!'!! !2!! Seeckt, p. 21.

p. 14.

7~., p. 22.
8~., p. 26.

3
section of the Great General Staff.

9

of the XVIII .i>.:rrrr:J Corps in Danzig.

Two years later he was the staff officer

His first direct command of troops came at

the age of thirty-six as a Company Commander in Dusseldorf in 1902.

Two years

later he was staff officer to the Fourth Division at Bromberg, from which he
was posted in 1906 to the General Staff in Berlin.

He became staff officer to

the Second Army Corps at Stettin in the year 1909.

Promoted to major in 1912

Seeckt became Battalion Commander of the First Baden Elite Grenadiers.

The

next year he was back in Berlin, this tilm a.s Chief of Staff of the Third
Brandenburg Army Corps, the post he held on the eve of the First \"Jorld War.
His early career had been that of the typical staff officer, alternating
between schools, staff duties, and actual command of troops.
It was during this long period of routine military training that Seeckt
began his extensive foreign travels.

Immediately following his graduation fro.

the War College in 1893, he married Dorothea Fabian, and after a brief honeymoon in Switzerland, he began his studies at the War Academy.

Seeckt and his

wife made almost yearly excursions that were to take them, betore the World
l-Iar, to all parts of Western Europe, North A:f"rica, and India.

Seeckt had a

professional motive tor these frequent journeys besides the natural indulgence

ot sight-seeing. In his biography of Bismarck's chief of staff, Seeckt
mentioned that Moltke had advised every staft officer to be well-travelled in
order to broaden his character by observing unfamiliar ways of life, and also

9Craig puts hi. en1ry in the General Starf in 1899. Gordon Craig, The
Politics 2! th~ Prussian ~ 1640-1945 (New York, 1956), p. )8).

4
as a means of developing his military tactical sense.

This latter was done by

fir st mastering every topographical feature of one's own country and how it ha
played its part in previous battles, and then by observing, as would a milt
attache, how a foreign country's geography and rosources could be used militar10
i~.
It is clear that Seeckt did this on his own travels. For example, in
a letter he stated that he has seen everything in India that was of interest
militarily and that he had even been fortunate enough to have had two long
11
talks with General Kitchener.
These travels ended with Sarajevo.

Seeckt's Third Corps belonged to the

First Army which had as its task the strike through Belgium towards Paris.
After the initial success of the drive (during which Seeckt received the Iron
12
Cross, First Class ) the First Army was forced by the outcome of the Battle
of the

~1arne

(September 5-12) to withdraw behind the Aisne River.
gradual~

position in the 'jJest was

Third Corps won a victory at

coming into being.

Vail~

later by a similar gain at Soupir.
breakthrough by the First

Arm¥

The war of

But on October 31, the

which it quickly followed up two days
This created the conditions for the minor

at Soissons in the first

~s

of November.

lVhether it was Seeckt's own plan or his application of a higher order that
provided this opportunity is immaterial, for in any event, he correctly
interpreted the weakness in the enemy's deployment and exploited it

lD.Hans von Seeckt, Noltka, ain Vorbild (Berlin, 1931), p. 39.
l\abenau,

!!!!!! ~

12~., p. 74.

;;.Se..;. e;..;;c;.;. ;kt;.;;.' pp.

46-52.

successfully.

13

As the man credited with the plans that were successful at Soissons,
Seeckt was promoted to Colonel and attracted the attention of

He

Falkenh~.

decided to use Seeckt as Chief of Staff in the Eleventh Army which was being
formed for the purpose of achieving the final breakthrough in the

\~est.

How-

ever, before it could be brought together, the German High Command decided on
victory in the East prior to a decision in France, and the embryo <Eleventh
Army was sent to Galicia where the Austrians were hard-pressed.

A joint

Austro-Hungarian and German operation under the leadership of Mackensen with
Seeckt as his chief of staff was begun with the capture of Gorlice on May 2,

1915. The battle ended in a Russian rout and the subsequent loss of Poland but
11
the one great battle or annihilation, which was its object never materialized.

Although Seeckt had planned the campaign with the object of completely destrqying all Russian forces in southeastern Europe,

Falkenh~J

harried in the West,

could not send sufficient troops and supplies to achieve this goal.

Thus the

brilliant tactical victory of Gorlice was never brought to its contemplated
strategic conclusion.

~

the end of the summer Mackensen was sent elsewhere,

winter quarters were taken up, and another opportunity lost for a final end to
the war against Russia.

For his part in the campaign Seeckt received Germany's

highest military honor, the

13

~~

_M_er_i.t.e, and a promotion to Brigadier

Schmidt-Pauli, Seeckt, p. 32.

14Rabenau, ~ ~ Seeckt, o. 150.

6
General (General-major).

15

The High Command now turned its attention in the East to the problems ot
linking up with its Turkish ally which had become imperative since the British
landings in Gallipoli.

Bulgaria in July ot 1915 secretly agreed to enter the

war on the side ot the Central Powers. This meant that a combined operation
against Serbia would bring contact with Turkey.

}1ackensen, newly released

:f'rom Poland, was put in charge of this operation and his request for Seeckt as
his Chief of Staft was soon granted.

The team ot Mackensen and Seeekt began

their drive with the capture of Belgrade on October 16.

By November 6, the

enemy was in full retreat and the way lay open to Sophia.

The landing of

Allied troops in neutral salonika came too late to stabilize the Balkan :f'ront,
and in December the evacuation of Gallipoli began.
AS a result the German line of attack was shifted to }lontenegro and
Albania in a drive on Salonika.
Aus~ian

However, a new offensive by Italy caused the

torees to be withdrawn from the Balkans and the Germans were lett with

the indifterent Bulgarians to carry out the plan.

The drive was being prepared

to commence in April but Falkenhayn weakened Jv1ackensen t s forces for the all-out
offensive at Verdun in February and at that time urged an immediate attack on
Salonika so as to coincide with the Western offensiva.

Seeckt advised

Mackensen against it on the grounds that he could only plan his operations on
the basis of what was militarily feasible and not what was politically expadient.

16

As a result the campaign against Salonika never began.

15~., p. 158.

16Schmidt-Pauli, Seeckt, p. 60.

7
In June, 1916 Seeckt was transferred from the Balkans to the Seventh Army
as Chief of Staff to the Austrian Archduke Charles (soon to be the last
emperor of h.ustria) llho was commanding the southeastern front.

In effect his

task was to coordinate the operations by the Central Powers in the entire
sector. 17 Two days after taking his post the Austrian line collapsed and a
general retreat began.

Ten days later they were back on the offensive and the

lost ground recovered.

By July fourth the front in East Galicia was broken an

the way to Bokovina was opened.

The following month a strong Russian counter-

attack sent the Austrians reeling back again.

Seeckt requested five divisions

to stabilize the front but could be spared only two.
what Seeckt always hated:

The situation now became

a war of position. !-lobility was lost because of the

lack of men, anmunition, and supplies.

All that could be done under such

circumstances was to hold the line in the dreary winter months that followed.
The Russian revolution and the protracted truce that terminated in the Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk eventually freed the troops on the Eastern front for other
duties.
In Dscember of 1917 Seeckt was sent to Turkey as Chief of the General
Staf'f of the Turkish

Arnv. There existed a great deal of antagonism between

the two allies stemming on the one hand from their mutually divergent and
unrealistic plans of expansion and on the other from the Young Turk leaders who
wished to take their country out of the war.

Seeckt, in the midst of these

political intrigues, was barely able to re-establish the Palestinian front.

17Craig, Prussian Politics, p. 383.

A

8
palace revolution wasted this effort and the new government surrendered to the
Allies on October 30.

Seeckt, who was on exceptionally good terms with all th

leading figures in Turkish political life, was allowed by the new regime to
lead all of his troops with their weapons back to Germany.
On January 10, 1919 Seeckt was appointed Chief of Staff to the Border

Defense North.

The Allies had permitted German military forces to remain under

arms on their eastern frontier to guard against Bolshevik infiltration.
situation was chaotic:

straggling German units fought their

the Lithuanians and Poles were

attemtpin~

the face of the German occupying forces.

way

The

back home and

to organize their own governments in
His official duties required him to

work with such insubordinate officers as Ora! von dem Goltz, the commander of
the Sixth Reserve Corps, which after the official liquidation of the Border
Defense group, became his own Freikorps unit.

Seecktts difficulties with Golt

and other such commanders made him realize the hopelessness of their independe
action. Although he felt that Germany needed eastern buffer territories for
protection against antagonistic Eastern neighbors, he knew that the first
priority of defense must be the creation of a strongly disciplined and united
18
military force.
In April he was transferred to Versailles as chief military advisor to the
German peace delegation. After the presentation of the Allied demands, Seeckt
drafted a negative report on the military conditions. He put forth his views
in a memorandum sent to the Gerrnan government on Hay 26 in which he castigated

18
Schmidt-Pauli,

S~eckt,

p. 76.

9

the military conditions laid down by the Allies as impossible of fulfillment,
19
but he added that resistance to the Allies was militarily out ot the question.
Under these circumstances Germany signed the Peace Treaty on June 28, 1919.
The last position he held in the imperial army was that of Chief of the
20
Great General Staff and so he was formally the last of Moltke's successors.
On

November 24, 1919 Seeckt received his appointment as Chief of the Troop

Oftice (Truppenamt) which served the newly created Reichswehr as a substitute
for the Great General Starf outlawed by the Treaty. His immediate superior waa
General Hans Reinhardt, Chief of the

Arnw High Cormnand (Heeresleitung) who was

subordinate to Gustav Noske, the Reichswehr Minister in the government's
cabinet.
A few months after assuming his duties in the Truppenamt, Seeckt and the
Reichswehr faced a crisis of conscience in the torm of the Kapp Putsch, March
13-17, 1920. Dr. Wolfgang Kapp, a minor official in the government, backed by
the guns of General Walther von Luttwitz's Reichswehr troops and various
Freikorps, declared an end to the Republic.

Noske called together his military

leaders to determine their attitude in the present situation.

Reinhardt alone

spoke for bmediate action by the Reichswehr to save the government.

Seeckt, i

contrast to the position he was to take in the Munich Putsch three years later,
spoke for the other generals and stated the impossihility of using the Reichswher to fight other units of the Reichswehr.

19Ibid., p. 80.
20aabenau, Hans ~ Seekt, p. 203.

The government, unable to employ

10
its military forces, fled Berlin and the abortive coup was ended a few
later by a general strike.

~ben

dav~

it returned, Noske was replaced by Otto

Gessler and Seekt now became Chief of the Army Command.

Noske had failed to

contro 1 the armed forces and Reinhardt did not have his subordinates f
confidence.
Seeckt at fifty-four was now the Republic t s leading military figure.

Sine

his return from Turkey he had gradually emerged from the overabundant supply of .
general staff officers whose future was uncertain to the position of creator of
the new and severely handicapped army.

His background was identical with that

of most officers in the Prussian army who had come from the impoverished,
uprooted, landless families of the nobility.B 2l His prewar starf training and
duties were certainly not out of the ordinary.

His war record demonstrated

some tactical ability, but hardly superior to that of many fellow officers.
The last years of the war had been spent almost in exile, out of touch with the
shifting developments of the home situation. He had cultivated no powerful
friends in the political sphere which he heartily disliked. Even his admiring
biographer admitted that he had too much humanity to be an ''historical
,,22
fi gure.
Apparently his reports from the vital area of the Eastern Border Command,
where he had been routine ly posted because of his experience there, was the

2lwalter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff 1657-1945 (New
York, 1953), p. 56.
- 22Rabenau, ~ !2!! Seeckt, p. 206.

11

reason for his selection for his advisory role at the Peace Conference. His
work here led to his selection as Chief of the Truppenamt. He was in a position of authority in which to take a stand on the question of the relation of
the new Army to the new state, which was dividing the officer corps.
Putsch resolved the entire problem.

The Kapp

The positions of Luttwitz that the arII'\Y

become revolutionary and of Reinhardt that it become republican were

official~

denied by Seeckt's appointment. 23
Seeckt opposed both because he believed the army had to remain isolated
from politics. Simply stated his position was that the Reichswehr was not to
be used as a police power to combat a part.icular regime's political opponents.
It was to be taken out of the realm of political intrigues.
of this viewpoint Seeckt set up the

'~ommission

In demonstration

for the Accomplishment of the

Investigation of Those Concerned in the Kapp-Luttwitz Putsch." Its outcome was
the dismissal of sixty officers and the shelving of 112 others. 24 The final
result of the affair was Paragraph Thirty-six of the Defense Law promulgated
on March 23, 1921:
Soldiers may not engage in political activity. While on duty such
activity is also forbidden to militar,r offiCials. Soldiers are
forbidden to belong to political clubs or to participate in political
meetings.25
Seeckt as head of the Reichswehr was present at the Conference of July

23walter Garlitz, Der Deutsche Generalsfab.
1945 (Frankfurt/am Ma1n;-t950), pp. 321-22.

Cleschichte und Gestalt 1657-

24s Chmidt-Pau11, Seeckt, p. 98.
25curt Riess, The Self Betrayedl
(New York, 1942), p:-71:---

Glory ~ ~ of ~ German Generals

12
1920, where the allied demands for the final composition and structure of the
German Army were imposed.

Seeckt's arguments for various changes were not

accepted and the hundred thousand man Reichswahr was required to comply with
the Conference's provisions no later than January 1, 1921.

The Allies assigned

a military commission headed by General Nollet to ensure that all the
conditions ware carried out to their satisfaction.

Seeckt maintained that

trying to negotiate successfully with this commission was one of his chief
26
duties in the Army Command.
Seeckt's energies were completely concentrated on the gigantiC task of
reorganizing, within the treaty limitations, the broken Germany army so that it
would be a military force capable of providing some guarantee of Germany's
sovereignty and at the same time providing the nucleus for expansion in the
future.

Germany's political leaders paid little attention to the manner of

this reorganization.

The withdrawal of the Reichswehr from an active role in

political affairs was the reason tor the government's apathy to what its
military leaders were doing in their own work.

The Reichswehr Minister,

Gessler, felt that his duty was to represent the interests of the Army in the
Reichstag rather than the opposite.

This meant that under the protection of

Gessler's ministerial office, Seeckt was in the position ()f having almost
complete freedom in military matters. 27
The year 1923 was the highpoint of Seeckt' s career.

At the beginning ot

26aabenau, Seeckt, p. 44.5.
27Harold J. Gordon, Jr., The Reichswehr and the German Republic 1919-1926
(Princeton, New Jersey, 19.57), pp. 314-335. --- ------ ----

13
January the French moved into the Ruhr under the terms of the Treaty which gave
them the right of occupation if the reparations were in default.

The German

government was advised by its military that the Reichswehr did not possess the
capability of stopping the French should they decide upon a further penetration
of Garmany. The German leaders were also deeply disturbed by the separatist
sentiments along the Rhine and in the south which were being supported by the
French.

In this crisis the government decided upon a policy of

'~assive

resistance" on January 12, 1923, to render the Ruhr unprofitable for the
French.

Instead of achieving this, a preoipitous inflation engulfed all

Germany.
The Ruhr crisis decided the Republic's leaders upon the necessity of
improving their

milit~

security.

To this end, Seeckt met with Severing, the

?russian Minister of the Interior, and they agreed upon the creation of an
unofficial formation of men called Worker Troops

(Arbeitertrup~)

which would

be trained and supplied with weapons by the Reichswehr. 28 This was the
beginning of the so-called "Black Reichswehrll which proved to be more
dangerous than useful because of their ill discipline and they were disbanded
after the Kuatrin Revolt (October 1-3, 1923).
On September 26, 1923 Dr. Gustav Strsaemann declared that the policy of

passive resistance had failed and he accepted the government's obligation to
maet all Allied demands.

In response to this defeat, the separatist elements

throughout Germany rapidly gained adherents and the Reich appeared near

28Rabenau, Seeckt, p. 362.

14
dissolution.
Republic.

In Bavaria, Gustav von Kabr was appointed Commissioner of a

TIlat night, September 27, 1923 Gessler was given executive powers

under Article 48 of the Constitution and the military became virtual dicator.
A few days later Hitler's Volkerischen Beobachter published a scurrilous
attack against 3eeckt and he promptly ordered it to cease publication. 29 Kahr
refused to execute the order and Seeckt ordered General Otto von Lossow, the
Bavarian Reichswehr commander, to use the military to carry out the decree.
Lossow refused and Kahr rewarded him with the appointment to head the
Bavarian Republic's Army. At this point Seeckt decided on action but was
overruled by the government.

On November 8, just as the situation seemed to

nearing its end, Hitler attempted his Beer I{all Putsch.

The Berlin government

responded to this by turning over Gessler's powers directly to Seeckt.

The

next morning, however, the Putsch was easily stopped by the Munich police.
During the four months that Seeckt exercised executive powers a
remarkable stabilization was achieved.

The Weimar Republic was given another

opportunity to succeed as a democratic government, even though this was
achieved by extraordinary measures.

The various separatist movements had been

crushed, internal bickering among the parties was temporarily abandoned, and
the ruinous inflation was checked.

During January 1924 some National

Socialists were involved in an assasination attempt on Seeckt because, as they
0
said at their trial, he was "' as much of a national menace as the Jews. , ,,3

29Gordon, Reichswehr, p. 236 has a translation of this verbal attack by th
National Socialist newspaper.
30rhe National Socialists later tried to suppress this fact.
Waite, Vanguard ~ Nazism (Cambirdge, Mass., 1952), p. 185.

Robert G. L.

1,
On February 13, 1924 Seeckt relinquished the

p~Ners

constitutional process was declared operative again.

he held and the ordinary
Seeckt refused the

suggestion of some of his subordinates and friends that he remain as
31
dictator.
The zeal and decisiveness he brought to the tasks facing him in
1923, the self-restraint employed, and the success obtained, mark this as the
zenith of Seeckt's career.
The death of Ebert in February 192, was followed by Hindenburg1s election
to the presidency in

M~.

A new era seemed to be beginning for Germany, one

in which she was again taking her place a.."Ilong the nations of Europe.

The

Locarno Pact was signed and relations with the West were much improved.

The

misunderstanding between Germany and Russia caused by the pact was resolved
with the Berlin Treaty (April 24, 1926) which remained the basis of RussoGerman relations until 193,.

In September 1926 Germany formally took her

place in the League of Nations.

This year of progress began happily for

Seeckt with his promotion to Co1one1-General (highest rank in the Reichswehr),
but ten months later he was no longer on active service.
of the

Army

Command October 8, 1926.

He resigned as Chief

Nor was he in Germany when, three months

later, the Allied Control Commission disbanded.

He had devoted so much energy

to this purpose, now that it was accomplished, it no longer had any personal
meaning for him.
The public motivation for his resignation was the furor raised by the press
over the affair of the Prussian Prince.

The facts are that Prince William of

Prussia, eldest son of the former Crown Prince, was seen by a correspondent

31Rabenau, Seeckt, P. 397.

16
taking part in the Reichswehr summer manoeuvers.

Seeckt maintained that he

was there only as an observer and that he was permitted to take part in some
of the staff exercises only on the understanding that he be discreet in
showing himself.

However, he was seen by a reporter in uniform. giving an

order to some soldiers.

Seeckt accepted the responsibility for the incident.

Press reaction to the fact that rqyalty was taking a role in the military was
outspokenly hostile.

Gessler made no attempt to help him over the demands for

his dismissal. With no sign of support from those in power there was nothing
to be done but comply.
The deeper motivations behind the dismissal have not been thoroughly
examined.

It is inconceivable that Germanr's leading military figure should

have been cashiered for What was, after all, a minor indiscretion and one
that had happened

pre~~ously.

It is understandable that political enimies

would utilize an opportune moment to rid themselves of an unwanted figure.
But the question remains as to why' those in power decided at this particular
moment to jettison Seeckt.

Gordon presents a picture of gradually deteriorat-

ing relations between Gessler and Seeckt resulting in Gessler's determination
to replace him. 32 But the decision to dismiss Seeckt was certainly wider than
this.

Gatzke asserts that Strcsemann had no part in the matter but that he

did not object. 33 It would be illuminating in the study of the Weimar

32
Gordon, Reichswehr, pp. 333-335.
33Hans W. Gatzke, Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germagy (Baltimore,
1954), pp. 60-61.
-

--.
17
Republic to know exactly the forces that combined to bring about Seeckt's
replacement.
Seeckt himself knew no more than that the parties of the Left were
34
against him.
He surmised that Hindenburg was behind the move but he felt
that he had more political friends than enemies and that he would be able to
play a

furt.~er role in Germany in some government capacity. 35 Immediately

after his resignation he left the country for a vacation.

It was his hope

that upon his return he would be inn ted to some responsible post for which
his knowledge and experience would qualif,r him.
suited best for diplomatic service. 36

Specifically he felt himself

In spite of the fact that he let it be

known that he desired such a position, the government made no move to disturb
his retirement.

He did, however, obtain a minor advisory post in the

Reichswehr Ministry which was probably meant to supplement his pension rather
than give him an opportunity to help shape policy although his opinion was
37
sought from time to time.
Seeckt's short career as a parliamentarian also rewAins to be investigated.

~~ediately

after his resigr.ation, Joseph Wirth tried to get him to

join the Center Party but he refused saying he wanted no party label. 38

In th

34Rabenau, Seeckt, p. 558.
35~., pp. 547-548.

36 Ibid •
37Ibid ., p. 626.
38Ib1d., pp. 627-628.
Catho1iCISiii.

This gave to rise to rumors of his conversion to

18
election of 1930 he decided to stand for the Reichstag as a member of the
German People's Party. 39 It was in the midst of a reorganization after
stresemann's death and to Seeckt

m~

have appeared to have a future.

He

worked very hard for election and toured the countr,r often making two or more
40
Seeckt took his seat as one of his part,yls representaspeeches in one day.
4l
tives for the next two years.
His record as a politician does not appear
outstanding.42
Seeckt, instead of becoming a state official, became at the end of his
43
life a prolific writer.
He took up residence in ~is beloved Berlin and
embarked upon a

liter~

career writing at first on

milit~

topics.

In 1927

••

an article, "Modern Cavalr,r," appeared in the Militar-Wockenblatt. Most of
his other military articles were published by the same journal.

In 1929 he

entered the esthetic and philosophical sphere b.Y writing a piece called
ItRemembrances of Salzburg" for the Frankfurter Zeitung.

In this same year

also appeared his first three books.
Antikes Feldherrntum (1929), a small work of thirty-five pages, dealt

39Ibid., p. 652.

-

40Ibid., p. 653.

4lJohn W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Poner; ~ German !!3! .!!!
Politics 19l8-.l21!2 (London, 1954J,p. 223. 1'here does not appear to be any
evidence for the statement made here that he was re-elected in 1932.
42w. M. Knight.Patterson, Germany; From Defeat to Conquest 1913-1933
(London, 1945), pp. 474 and 484. This contains some-of his Reichstag-speeohes
on military questions.
43Rabenau, Seeckt, pp. 578-622. This contains a swmmary of twenty-six
artioles and books which represent only a part of Seeckt's total work.
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with military leadership.

Alexander, Caesar, Hannibal, and Napoleon were

presented as the prototypes of supreme commanders of grand strategy.

In

Gedanken eines Soldaten (119 pages), Seeckt presented the views of a military
man on such topics as slogans, modern military problems, pacifism, imperialism
and the need for leadership in the post-war period.

The book was divided into

a series of disjointed sections but it served as an excellent index to his
most prominent ideas.

The

for the popular reader.

l~,rgest

section of the work was clearly intended

The last work in 1929,

~

Zukunf't

.2!!

Deutsches

Reiches (192 pages), examined the present needs for the German State in
accordance with certain historical precedents and theoretical limitations.
The whole sphere of the state was analysed and certain general and specific
recommendations were set forth.
Landesverteidiguns (94 pages), published in the following year, eXamined
the whole problem of German defense in the modern context of mass warfare.
The lessons of the World

\~ar

future wars might be fought.

were presented in order to determine the way
Here Seeckt also suggested the way in whioh a

future German army should be constituted when the Treaty restrictions were
abolished.
In 1931 Seeckt published his historical study, Moltke

~

Vorbild (187

pages), the result of his lifelong admiration of Bismarck's Prussian Chief of
Staff.

It was his best literar,y effort,

we1l-const~Joted

and well-written.

The work served him as a vehicle for the presentation of his own military
ideas.

It was an apologia for his own work, thinly veiled as intellectual

history, emphasizing the parallels between Moltkets time and his own.
During the first year of the Nazi era Seeckt published two last books.

20

-

Die Reichs"t'lehr (140 pages), retold the history of the reconstruction of the

German knmy after its defeat under the restrictions of the Treaty.

Seeokt

related the events in the third person, never imitating that he played
role in what he is describing.

Deutschland zwischen

orientation of GermanY's foreign policr.r.

~ ~ ~

~

examined the

Each neighboring country was

subjected to an exam.ination for its possible role in relation to the Reich in
the coming power struggle between East and West.
In 1932 the Chinese nationalist government requested a military advisor
from Germany.

Seeckt agreed to serve as an advisor to the mission and left

for China in April 1933.

However because of heart trouble he returned to

Germany in August of the same year.
and remained there until I1arch 1935.
by

He left again for China in Janu,ry 1934
His work in China was officially denied

the German government, but Seeckt "is regarded by some as having really

laid the foundation for the organization of the modern Chinese Arrrry.n 44
In October 1935 Germany unilaterally declared the military prohibitions
of Versailles at an end.

The following year, on his birthday Seeckt received

a congratulatory telegram from Hitler granting him the unusual honor of
becoming the commander of his original regiment, the Alexander Grenadiers.
Seeckt's life had come full Circle.
had begun.

His career ended in the regiment where it

On December 27, 1936, about four o'clock in the morning Seeckt

was found dead of a heart attack holding an

Er~lish

novel in his hands.

4Uxurt Bloch, German Interests and Policies in the Far East, Institute of
Pacific Relations Inquiry Series (Ne~ork, 1940);-p:-r~----

21
Hi tIer' 5 perfunctory telegram of condolence to his widow read in part, "The
Generaloberst will be remembered by posterity as a great soldier.,t 4,
days later a State funeral was held.

Three

••
HitlAr, Goring,
and Blomberg accompanied

the coffin to the Military Cemetary and as the coffin was 10w8r.ed into the
gr~und,

the band

pl~ed

- - -

the traditional Ich Hat ein Kamerad.

4'SOhmidt-Pauli, Seeokt, p. 191.

.;.;.;;~..-;;

CHAPTER II
THE REICH
Seecktt s

~

Future

.2! .!:.!:!. German

Empire

(.ill:!

Zukunft

!!!! Reiches),

published three years after his retirement, contains his major ideas on the
state.

Its subtitle, Postulates

!E2

Criticisms (Urteile

~

Forderungen),

made clear that he was less concerned with organizing a political system of
his own than with the presentation and application of principles he considered
relevant for the Reichts problems in this critical period of its development.
He believed strongly that

Germa~

needed practical policies of action for the

immediate future rather than more political theories.

I

doctrinaire approach to political questions he rejected

Any utopian or
tot~

b.1 his

insistance that the political process was one of organic development. 2
For Seeckt, concepts such as the Reich, nationalism, historicism, and
individualism Here the central realities of political life. Within this

IHans von Seeckt, The Future of the German ~mpire; Postulates and
CriticisMS, trans. Oakley Williams"1"tOOdon, 1930 , p. 26.
2Ibid., p. 53:

"It is not difficult to conjure up a vision of an ideal

State,~ functions of which are determined on what appear to be logical

prinCiples, rut the State in which we are living is not a guinea-pig for
vivisection b.Y theorists and we cannot afford the luxury, less than ever
nowadays, of redUCing wrong tenets to absurdity for the instruction of their
disciples. It Ibid., p. 10): "The fulfilment of the needs of the day in the
course of natiOnil evolution, that is politics."
22

23
framework he was able to take up what he thought to be the necessar,y reforms
of the state institutions, the parliallentary and executi va powers, the
relationship between the individual and the communit,r, police powers,
economics, and cultural forces.
At the heart of Seeckt's political thought was his idea of the Reich.
English synonyms for this word are "realm, It "state," or "empire" and as a
proper noun it has been commonly used to designate various former German
states.

Usually, however, Seeckt emplo,red the word in a more abstract and

broad sense than this and it had for him a deeply emotional, almost mystical,
significance.

At the outset of

!h!

Future

2! ~

German Empire, Seeckt

established his intention to give to the term "Reich" a wider connotation than
merely that of a state, and in no w~ was it to be taken to represent the
3
existing state institutions.
There is, he wrote, "something supersensuous"
about this word, stemming as it does from the distant Roman past and
continuing to exist even when it has been forbidden a political form, since
even then "its being (Wesen) remains. n4 The Reich, he continued, existed in
the material world as a political form of government, but it waS essentially
"an organic living entity (Lebewesen), subject to the laws of evolution"

,

which in his day was lIalmost the sole uncontested bond of unity" among the
German people.

This word, then, was meant by him to signify the continuous

3Ibid., p. 23.
4Ibid.

-

'Ibid.

24
national spirit or soul of Germany in a very living and vital sense.

6

Seeckt's Hegelian-like concept of Reich expressed primarily the national,
and not political, character of the German people.

His nationalism Has rooted

in a belief in Deutschtum, the national genius, and he was confident it would
accommodate itself successfully to the modern age of the nation-state.

In

viewing the thousand years of the Reich's existence, Seeckt saw that the unity
of the nation had been spiritual and cultural rather than political, so that
the nation was still trying in his own d~ to adapt a state to fit its
particular needs. 7 He emphasized, in the forward for the English translation
of

~

Zukunft

Reiches, that non-Germans should not mistake this political

~

inexperience for weakness, but understand that the national solidarity of the
German people had

alw~s

been much greater than their political unity.8

He

was certain that two traits in the German character, their willingness to
undertake difficult tasks and their Itsound political instinct," would result
in a successful conclusion to the domestic dangers of his own time. 9 In
particular, he characterized Prussia as the model for the construction of a
German state because its sense of discipline and of individual service to the
cormnuni ty had made it the most successful politically of the man;r German
10
groups.

6It is difficult to understand the reasons which caused the translator of
Die Zukunft des Reiches to use invariably the Bismarckian "Empire" as the
proper synonym for "Reich."
7Ibid. ,

'0.

98.

8..!.lli. , p. 15 •

-

9Ibid. , p. 16.
10Ibid. p. 101.

Seeckt rejected an

internationalis~

which in trying to eradicate the

natural national spirit of modern states would actually result in powerful
states dominating the t1eak by using internationalism as a mask for their own
ll
aggressive nationalism.
He admitted the existence of a co~~on European
culture and thought that just as it was possible for states to co-operate in
this sphere, a true international feeling based on a strong nationalism might
emerge so that nations might share the best in their individual characters. 12
He welcomed the "wholesome If reaction that was growing in many countr:i ea
besides Germany against the type of internationalism that meant to erase
national characteristics. 13 He cautioned, however, that unless the government
tried to guide this growing nationalism into constructive channels, radical
14
movements might seize power.
Any such dictatorship, he felt, whether of the
right or of the left, could never be truly national because they would look to
politically-similar foreign allies in subjugating their fellow citizens. l >
Seeckt identified the nation with a community of interests and never with
a racial group. He realized that in the present phase of history nationality
was important. 16 However, his nationalism showed no trace of raCism, or in

llIbid. , p. 148.
l2 Ibid • , pp. 13-14.
l3.!~., p. 147.

l4Ibid ., p. 148.
l>Ibid. , p. 146.
l6 Ibid • , p. 177.

-
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particular anti_Semitism.

17

Nor did he hold Pan-German views.

He believed in

the Bismarckian Reich which had excluded the Austrian Germans whose interests
1S
were not consistent with the new federation.
He praised Bismarck's foreign
policy as having taught "a healthy sense of nationality" by forcing Germans to
uni te in a common cause 01' defense. 19 He er1lici tly castigated those who
dreamed of incorporating all

~iermans

into one state as being unrealistic and

deluded by the perennial chimera of the Holy Roman Empire of the German
Nation.

20

He believed, however, in a special "German mission" which was to
export its culture to the world and to those who were in need of it. 21
~ansion

of territorial Germany was not at this time a practical possibility

although he certainly was not against exploiting any opportunities that might
23
develop. 22 In particular, he wished the return of the colonies.
But he
felt that these were not the most important matters confronting Germany. '!tlhat
was of particular urgency was the conservation of the Reich through the
achievement of a national unity of nurpose in a truly German state. 24
In speaking of preserving the Reich and not the Republic Seeckt was in no

l?In his manY writiaps he attacked no groups on racial grounds and Gordon
quotes Hitler's attack on him as a Jewish partisan; Harold J. Gordon, Jr., cf.
The Reichswehr and the German Republic, 1919-1926 (Princeton, New Jersey, 19,7

P:-236.

-

-

18Seeckt, Future

-

£f ~

-

Empire, p. 99.

19Ibid., p. 148.
20rIans von Seeckt, Deutschland zwischen ~ ~ Ost (Hamburg, 1933), p.
21I'qid., p. 7.
22Ibid.
23Ibid.
• 97.
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way implying an anti-republican outlook.

Instead he was following the usage

established by the authors of the Weimar Constitution.

As they stated in its

preamble and first article, the official name for Germany was the German Reich
25
and not the German Republic.
In justifying the preservation in the
Constitution of t."is a."Ilbiguous word "Reich" because of its intimate association with the historical German desire for national unit,y, Hugo Preuss, its
principal drafter, observed, liThe word, the thought, the principle of the
Reich has for us Germans such deeply rooted emotional values that I believe we
26
cannot assume the responsibility of giving up this name. It
Such an expressio
of feeling coincided with Seeckt's own affection for the use of the word
"Reich It as a concept prior in value to the form of its state.
Nor did Seeckt's use of the word imply former imperial allusions.
realist, Seeckt understood that the monarchy was irrevocably gone.

As a

He was, in

fact, rather bitter that the Kaiser had abdicated in such an ignomonious
27
fashion.
He recognized the advantages that the mi1itar,r had enjoyed under
the former

reg~~

and he regretted their loss.

But he was fully prepared to

accept the Republic as long as it responded to what he considered to be the
the needs of the Reich. 28 Whatever his suspicions or dislikes of the Republic

25Arno1d Brecht, Federalism and Regionalism lE Germagr: ~ Division of
Prussia (New York, 1945), p. 6: 'WTFie German Reich is a republic."
26Koppe1 S. Pinson, Modern Germanr (New York, 1954), p. 402.
27Hans von Seeckt, ~ Reichswehr (Leipzig, 1933), u. 16.
28Seeckt, Future ~ Empire, p. 103.

28
mlrJ have b<;en, he was not a conscious monarchist and he had no tolerance for
those within the Reichswehr who wished to work for its return. 29
Seeckt was not overly concerned with any narticular form assumed by the
state, that is, the Reich in its political sense.

He felt that in accordance

with past developments and present needs there were a variety of structural
alternatives which the state might employ to fulfill its goal of promoting
30
individual and community welfare.
The form of the state was simply an amora
means to an end and the manner in which results were achieved was a question
31
of style.
He equated good government with successful government regardless
of how it was organized. 32 The fact that he called his chapter on the
structure of the state "The Machinery" indicated his feeling that the type of
government was of secondary importance.
He acknowledged that there were general prinCiples of successful government, but he felt that their doctrinaire application without regard for the
individual circumstance was certain to harm the vitality of the state. 33 For
Seeckt, the only absolute principle was the "organic law of evolution" which

29Qordon, Reichswehr, pp. 307-308.
30Seec kt, Future.2! Empire, p. 25 and 175.
3lIbid., P. 175: "These forms are suhject to historical evolution and of
themselves are~ neither good nor bad; you :'1ight call them ••• mutable forms of
style, of which nothing more is asked than that they do not mar the main plan.'

-

32Ibid., p. 122.
33Ibid., p. 97.

29
operated through a "struggle for life."

34

This idea of systematic development

of organisms was his basic philosophical position and certainly not an
uncommon one for a ;nan of his generation.

Such a doctrine of "the incessant

nux of thingslt resulted in a thorough-going political relativism. 35
Poli tic al forms are of no more supernational, than of supertemporal,
value. To rea'ize this insures us against a mistaken conservatism
looking for eternal verities in mutable forms. State institutions,
organizations, legal codes have in themselves, no everlasting
worth. They have grown up, are in being today, and are subject to
change in the future.36
He reasoned that, even though it was an unpopular idea, the "histOrically
logical consequences 'If past happenings" limited man's freedom of meaningful
action. 31 He believed, however, that this evolutionar.y process could be
directed by "the man of actionlt who had a true understanding of lithe
continuity of the past to which the future is fatefully linked.,,3 8 The leader
who had "served the term of his apprenticeship and pupillage in History"
could co-operate with the movements and forces of the past and so guide the
course of the present. 39

It was through the stuQy of history that man

achieved some measure of freedom by teaching him where "the laws of being and

34Ibid., p. 20 and 25.
35 Ibid • , p. 25.
36Ibid •

-

31Ibid ., p. 19.
38Ibid • , p. 20.

-

39Ibid ., p. 21.

30
growthll were 1eading.40 i'1an could do as he wished but his actions, however
understandable or even praiseworthy, were fruitless if done tlin opposition to
the organic law of evolution. ,,41

He demanded that the leader be a realist

who did what was possible within the historical situation and he dismissed the
idealist as a positive danger. 42
To Seeckt, history was not a speculative study but a practical method for
determining a course of action.

His historicism, however, did not concern

itself with guessing the future, a pursuit he called "labour lost.,t43

Just as

he did not believe in political theory producing successful government
policy, so he did not have aqy hope in actions based on prophesies. 44 He
added, however, that since present affairs would affect future generations,
action had to be responsibly undertaken with an understanding of their background and consequences. 45 Thus, he concluded, the conservative and liberal
were natural and complementar,r partners in maintaining and fostering the
vitality of the Reich. 46
Although he made no forecasts of the political future, the quality of

40Ibid ., p. 22.

-

41Ibid., P. 20.
42Ibid.
43Ibid. , p. 21.

45Ibid • , p.
-

44Ibid., p. 19.

22.

46 Ibid ., p. 22-3.

31
his historical sense can be judged from what he considered to be the significant factors in Germany's political past and his assessment of, the problems
and historical forces present in 1929.

The basic fact he wrote, in Germany's
political development was the unbalanced growth of its nation and state. 47 By
this he meant that the long, continuous history of factional strife among the
German people caused the Reich to evolve into a state more slowly than other
European countries. 48 The final success of this growth was dependent upon the
development of a cammon political unity within the German nation.

Seeckt saw

this beginning in Napoleon's dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1803 and
the consequent regrouping of the German states culminating in Bismarck's
Reich of 1871, an imperfect dynastic federation but another large advance
towards a truly German state. 49 The Weimar Republic, in his opinion, had not
0
made any significant further progress in the evolution of political unity.5
He characterized his period in history as fla turning-point of Time.,,51
The First World War and the Revolution had thoroughly disrupted the
maturation of German unity but he did not consider this to be the beginning of
!tan entirely new epoch. 1t52 Even so great a debacle as the war did not destroy

48 Ibid., p. 15-16 and 98.
-

47Ibid. , p. 15.

49Ibid., p. 98-99.
5Orbid., p. 99-100.
51Ibid ., p. 20.

52 Ibid ., p. 42.
-
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the basic laws of evolution although it did redistribute the balance of
historical forces, most notably the heightening of nationalism in all
countries. 53 The problem for Germany was to make this a cohesive movement
instead of a divisive one.

Seeckt identified the present with a struggle for

national unity in the face of ten years of internal unrest.

Although the

"German nation has yet to live itself into its new State and conciliate
domestic antagonisms" he was confident that at some future time "the common
factor will beoome a matter of course and Germany will resume the course of
quite evo1ution.,,54 He oonceived the "urgentll task before the contemporary
politician to be the oonservation of Germany as a political unit,r.55
Seeokt designated some of the general prinoip1es necessar,y to the
evolution of the Reich's political unity as the gradual reduction of the
mk~ber

of German states, the strengthening both of the executive and of local

government, the oonstant reduction of bureaucraoy, the reform of the
parliamentary system, and the priority of the oommon good.
He envisioned the ultimate goal of political unity as a federal union of
unit states (Einheitsstaat) to be achieved by the gradual reduotion of the
total number of German states (Lander).
three groups:

the large, vital states capable of growth (only Prussia was so

54Ibid., p. 17-18.

-

He divided these various states into

33
designated); intermediate states which justif,r their continuing separate
exi stence, and the "historical keepsakes lt that serve no purpose at all and are

ultimate~

destined to be absorbed within the first group.56

Reforms based on

this evolutionary principle of "State simolification," Seeckt cautioned, had
to await the needs of actual future conditions before they could be carried
57
Although it would be a long time before this was accomplished, the
out.
politicians had "to quicken and to facilitate i t.,,58

Seeckt believed that

such an integration would eventually and inevitablY develop but to attempt to
compel a new grouping of states "by way of Parliamentary force majeure"

1,;01~ld

hinder true German unity. 59
Prussia embodied in a special way for Seeckt all that he honored about
the Reich.

To show that Prussia had the right flto enlargement and hegemony

within the Empire" he described the special qualities of this "model of the
State in itself. 1I60
Not constructed on alien models, never having shed a closely knit
tribal community, but created by, and developed from the State
idea itself, Prussia attaches organicallY all particles within the
range of its magic power of attraction to itself without destroying their characteristics, but by making them subserve the weal
of the realm, that stiffened the rich, but soft and versatile
German Kultur life by the strictUf'!SS of its sense of duty; the

56Ibid., p. 99.
57Ibid •

-

-

59Ibid., 102-103.

-

6Orbid., 101.

<"~
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only German State that knew how to acquire new territory for the
German genius (Deutschtum), the social state in its truest sense,
because, if it inexorably demanded the devotion of the
individual to the State, it was at all times prepared to place
the might of the State at the service of the peop1e.6l
He left no doubt that Prussia would "gradually absorb and incorporate the
small States that come within its geographical and political orbit" and
believed that Gennan unity would be served by the eventual absorption of all
the three types of states "into the fim Prussian State union. ,,62 Such was
his solution to a perplexing problem which he blamed the Weimar government
for not solv1ng.63

He believed in a political centralization of power within

the proven and viable PruBsian state.
Seeckt meant this centralization to be federal in character because the
Prussian experience had proved the beneficial effects of sharing authority
between the central and local governments. 64 Centralizing tendencies were, he
thought, inherent in the modern state's need Ilof rationalizing administrative
work and of facilitating routine control" in its promotion of the common
good. 65

The areas in which only the central government operated were foreign

affairs and the armed forces. 66

62Ibid., p. 103.
61Ibid.

63Ibid.
64Seeckt, Future, 105.

-

65Ibid., p. 108.
66 Ibid. , p. 105.

-

In all other areas, he maintained, the centr

35
goverrunent must be confined lito laying down general lines, to supervising, to
conciliating and to lending a helping hand. 1I67 His view of sound centralization was based on the self-administration by local units of general state
policies.

Seeckt believed that the cause of unity was served by giving as

much local authority as possible to the various states but he did not offer
any

concrete program of reform to implement such a general principle.
Overcentralization, in his 'liew J was a dominant characteristic of the

i~eimar

Republic which had "imposed ever-increasing duties on itself in the

mistaken view that it ought itself to work for the welfare of its citizens,
whereas its function is to take steps to enable them to reach this standard of
welfare by their own exertions, and then to watch over and protect them in
this state of prosperity. 1168

By assuming the burden of what ought to be left

to the several states, the Heimar Republic had created an "atrophied,
lymphatic bureaucracy" whose members were actually "only governing and directing one another.,,69

He criticized the civil service for having become

impersonal, unrealistic in its remoteness from actual needs, restricted by the
"curse of red tape," bound to mediocrity, and most particularly, politically
70
appointed.
In contrast to the present civil servants he praised those who
remained on their jobs during the November revolution of 1918 because they
proved themselves servants of the state and not of a political part.y. 71

67Ibid. , p. 111.
68Ibid ., p. Ill.

-

69Ibid. , p. 112.
7OJ:bid. , p. 113-114.
71~.J

p. 115.

He

36
fel t that the parliamentary system primarily was responsible for the growth
of the 'tleimar bureaucracy since party politics have need of patronage. 72 His
solution to the problem of excessive bureaucracy was again the principle of
self-administration on the part of local units of government who would best
73
know how to deal with their own affairs.
That parliamentar,y government had fostered bureaucracy was only one of
the reasons he was against it.

Fundamentally he felt that a parliament was

incapable of governing

because it would represent party strength and

proper~

not national interest. 74 Tne democratic notion that parliament expressed the
wishes of the people was illusory because, he believed, people were
unconcerned with specific politioal issues. 75 He admitted that there was
such a thing as the peoples' will on grave, general issues so that elections
usually were based on the simplification of such issues through the use of
76
slogans.
But the Weimar parli&~ent did not even reflect this, he thought,
because the proportional s,ystem of election, intended to give a voice to
minori ty interests, only severed th.e contact between the electorate and the
candidates. 77 His conclusion was that the party leader in parliament might

-

72Ibid., p. 116.

-

73 Ibid ., p. 116-117.

-

74Ibid., p. 122.

-

75 Ibid ., p. 118-119.
76 Ibid ., p. 118.

77Ibid., p. 120.
-
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just as well cast a vote representing the number of members of his part,y and
to thus acknowledge the "unqualifi ed triumph of numbers. It 78
Seeckt did not mean by this that parliament did not have useful work to
do or that individual deputies did not represent at times the interests of the
nation.

He acknowledged that the party system in a parliament was "the

natural sequel to the people's participation in political life. It 79

But he

repudiated the idea of majority rule as "the absolute domination of numbers"
80
and contrary to true democracy which insured the rights of minorities.
Government by a parliament of part,y influences could never serve the interest
of the whole nation.
The proper function of a parliament was not to legislate but to advise
and guide the leader of the state by helping him with their special knowledge
of the national needs.

He thought that parliament's task was not to make laws

but to be a center for publio opinion and as the people became more
politically experienced, the more would the government have to acoept the
81
advioe of the parliament which represented them.
Seeokt was vague on the
matter of testing

parliL~ent's

representation of the people but he did suggest

that a means other than "the arithmetical" be found. 82 Parliai'Tlentwas, he

78 Ibid •

-

79Ibid.
80Ibid ., p. 121.

-

-

81 Ibid • , p. 122 and 171.
82 Ibid ., p. 122.
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said, "conscious of its own incapacity to rule and to govern" since in times
of crisis it in'Tariably tended to look for a strong man or allowed the mob to
83
seize power.
He summed up the functions of a parliament as "supporting,
counselling and keeping a watch on a State direction that has the people's
confidence behind it.,,84
Parliamentar,y government was the chief cause for the ten years of postwar political instability and the main remedy was to free the executive from
parliamentar,y majorities.

The need for executive leadership was founded on

the basic principle "underlying all forms at all times" which is that of "the
worth and value attached to personality. 1,85 He cited If the triumph of
democratic and pseudo-democratic" forms of government as the cause for unrest
and revolution in the modern world which both illustrated lithe incapacity of
mob rule" and demonstrated the need for personal leadership in those very
states which had repudiated it.

86 The necessit.1 of personal rule may exist

only in the abstract and not be committed to any particular individual, but he
insisted, "The sense of incapaCity to rule, for the most part unconscious and
rarely admitted, is inherent in the mob, and in the hour of danger this sense
rises to terror; mass terror leads to panic, to cha.os--or to lea.dership.II B7

83Ibid., p. 123.
84Ibid.

--

85Ibid., p. 176.

86 Ibid •
87Ibid., p. 177.

-
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The concluding chapter of

~

Future

2!. .!:!:!! German

Empire amplified his

views on the nature of political leadership and made clear that every
properly functioning state conformed to the principle of a strong and
88
independent executive.
Seeckt was purposefully vague in defining the
limitations on the powers of the head of the state because theory could not
dictate the needs of the historical moment.

However, he did concede that

there should be some unspecified constitutional safeguards on the personality
90
But he gives no indication that he
of the leader exceeding his office.
could even conceive of the possibility of a willful and perverse individual
gaining power. Whatever the limitations, a wide latitude must obtain so that
the executive was free to take the necessary action in emergencies and to
91
oversee the nation as a whole.
This ability to represent the entire people and their interests was a
special attribute of the head of state and one that no

par1ia~entary

system

could emulate. To personifY his nation was the primary responsibility of the
1eader. 92 In previous times this had not alw~s been the case, so that he
wrote, !tIt is only the historical deve10nment of the sense of nationality that

88 Ibid., p. 176.
89Ibid., 180.
9Orbid., p. 180: "Trust on the one side and a sense of responsibility on
the other furnish more trustworthy limitations than legal documents."
91Ibid., p. 181.
92 Ibid •

-
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has made this postulate a matter of course. •

Such a representation,

in the person of the executive, of lithe State as a nation" was a very
important check to an unsound internationalism, and which a victorious
poli tician bound to represent his own particular party' might not be able to
carry out.

94 The head of state could not be expected to break his own

convictions or ties of association but he must be prepared to foster and
integrate a wide variet,y of differing interests

\~thin

the nation excepting

only those that would do violence to the very existence of the state. 95 He
96
must be above but equidistant from all.
He professed no interest in whether this leadership would take the form
of dictator, king, or president, as this was a question solved Qy the Reich's
evolution.

97

~ihatever the form, he argued, the head of state must not be

responsible to majorities, as in the case of a parliamentary leader, but must
be "responsible to himself and, what is the same thinp:,to his people alone."

9R

Because of the very fact. 0f the leader's burdensome responsibility', lithe man
99
of des'tinylt was often driven to assume this office.
He believed that such
a man, even thougn he made mistakes, cannot be discharged because he ha.d made

93 Ibid ., p. 177.
179.
95Ibid •
96 Ibid., p. 178.
94rbid.,

:1.

97Ibid., p. 176.
98 Ibid ., p. 182.
99Ibid.

-
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them for the common welfare.

100

He stated that it was the trulY democratic

state with its shared responsibilit.y that had the greatest need for the single
centralizing personality in whom its unit.y was crystallized. 10l The people
must trust their leader and in return he must subordinate his own feelings to
102
his assumption of responsibility for the cammon good.
Seeckt's conception of the head of the state being often an exceptional
individual with wide latitude of powers to accomplish his tasks found the
limitation of his freedom in the demands of the nation.

The issue of

individual freedom and the power of the state is likewise resolved b.Y an
appeal to the common good.

The source and goal of the state, according to

Seeckt, is the individual, and the individual's freedom, was a right which
must be guaranteed as far as possible since the individual is the basic unit
of society without which there would be no state. lO)
But since the state had a wider responsibility than to the single
individual, it must interfere with his rights in the interests of the whole
104
communit.y.
Restraints on personal freedom should be as few as possible in
normal Circumstances, but dictatorial powers might be justified by a time of
105
crisis.
Such exceptional laws must be done away with as soon as the
immediate danger is past since their existence is an indication of basic

102 Ibid.
lO3Ibid.,
108 and 163.
104Ibid., p. 164 and 165.
lOOrbid., p. 182.

10lIbid., p. 183.

-

1'.

105Ibid., p. 165.
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governmental unsoundness.

106

Seeckt examines property, security, and free

speech as fundamental rights of the citizen, and yet in each case what is
discussed is the necessit,y of state interference in these rights.
In every case Seeckt resolved the perennial IIstruggle between freedom and
the State" by emphasizing the priority of the common good.

107

In theory

Seeckt saw the importance of personal freedom but when it came to a practical
assessment of how that freedom worked, the result, except in the case of
economics, was the integration of the individual into the common good.

He

solved the problem of freedom and power in the voluntary acquiescence by a
"free" communitu of individuals in all that was needed for the domestic and
108
foreign strength of the Reich.
It would appear that Seeckt regarded the
individual as being meaningful only as a part of societ.y and not in his own
right.

The Reich, and not theoretical individual rights, are emphasized in

Seeckt's thought.

Questions of personal freedom are invariably approached

from the point of view of social obligation.

He did not believe that there

were anY rights or laws of justice which were absolute.

109

He based his

theory of law on the strength of the state to carry out what were the
110
particular needs of the nation.
He characterized as weak, codes of law
that were adhered to slavishly while the national good suffered and praised

l06Ibid. , p. 94.

-

107Ibid., p. 165.

-

108Ibid., p. 165.

llOrbid. ,
-

109Ibid. , p. 91.
p.

92.
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the English example of unwritten law.

111

Seeckt, in speaking of the securit,y of the individual, underlined that
this is not primarily a question of right or law but of the police power of
112
the state.
He excused questions of excesses qy the police as the
unfortunate results of enforcement. 113 He repeated here that if the state
did not interfere in this area of public order that the law of competition
would result in harmful anarchy.114 In return for domestic peace, the citizen
must voluntarily submit his freedom to the strength of the state.
The right of free speech must be maintained qy the state because, Seeokt
believed, conflict was a law of nature and hence tithe suppression of its
expression leads to the danger either of stagnation or of exp1osion.,,11.5
Restraints, in his opinion, were to be imposed not from fear of differences of
opinion, which he regarded as a heal thy sign of civic participation in the
work of the state, but because it created a dangerous impression of weakness
which foreign powers might misinterpret. 116 He cautioned the reader that sine
it was action and not debate which caused responsibility, that once a course

-

lllIbid., p. 93.
112Ibid., p. 169.
113Ibid., p. 131-

55.
ll.5Ibid., p. 171.
-

114Ibid., p.

116Ibid ., p. 170-171.

-
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of action had been decided upon by the government, debate on the matter ceased
117
to have any meaning.
In this area he was not concerned with the private
expression of opinion but only with its publio utterances, especially

by

parliament.
It was in the realm of property rights that Seeckt was most reluctant to
push his conception of state interposition for the cammon good.

He believed

that it was here that the state had to be most cautious in maintaining the
public interest because the "whole property-owning stratum of the nation" was
the foundation of the state's very existence. 118 The virtue of this class was
its "diligence, thrift, enterprise, initiative, and sense of responsibilityfl
to which the state must give free scope and whose success enabled the
financially unproductive state through taxation to obtain the funds necessar,r
119
for its operation.
The danger that Seeckt saw was that the period of
inflation and deflation caused by post-war conditions, the demands of
reparations, the over-expansion of state services, and the orushing tax
structure had alienated the very class that the state must depend upon to
120
function.
The resulting resentment and resistance on the part of the peop1
who showed such a high spirit of sacrifice during the war made Seeckt warn of
grave future consequences. 12l High taxes throttle the industrious and only

-

l17Ibi d., p. 172.

-

l18 Ibid ., p. 168.
l19 Ibid ., p. 166.

-

l20~.,

p. 167.

l21llWl., p. 167.
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aggravate the condition of a weakening economy.

Prf;Tate enterprise for profit

which utilized the valuable principle of the worth of the personality must be
122
fostered b,y the government.
The right of property, as all other rights, must yield to the prior
right of the community.

The principle involved in this area, and Seeckt

called its understanding of highest importance, is this:
Competition, the struggle for life, which Nature has laid down
as a law, cannot and must not be eliminated from economic life,
we need it to encourage efficiene,y; but it is the function of
the State to confine this struggle within the bounds set by
the weal of the community and to prevent the uneconomic
oppression of the weak by the abuse of the superior strength of
the stronger.123
In interfering in economic matters the state must be careful not to restrict
private enterprise and limit itself to a constructive and protective
124
approach.
For this reason Seeokt rejected a state planned economy which would only
result in stagnation and lack of individual initiative, and favored instead a
temporary state assistance to the producer with the view to eventual
125
He recalled that Germaqr had been forced b,y adverse condiindependence.
tions during the war to set up extreme state controls but some "fanatics of
organizationtl regarded this temporary but necessary evil as a model state

-

122 Ibid ., p. 49.

-

123Ibid., p. 55.

-

l24Ibid ., p. 48.

-

125Ibid., p. 37.
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126
economy.
Even more did he repud iate socia lism which he dismi ssed as
intel lectu ally nothin g more than a sloga n. 127 Socia lism, in
his defin ition ,
was Itthe endeavour to place all economic resou rces, includ ing
capit al and
prope rty, entir ely under the custody of the State ."128 This
idea he found
economically wrong because the state was unable to creat e but
only use value s,
and false polit icall y in that the state was not meant to be omnip
otent but
could only multi ply a usele ss burea ucrac y. 129 The ultim ate dange
r to the stat
of such ideas wore that they could not, as their propo nents believ
ed, be
stopp ed short of their logic al end which he saw as Bolshevism 130
.
Such movements as Russi an Communism were perni cious because they were
religi ous dogmas
which appeal to the masses who "do not think , but belie ve. It 131
At the other
extreme there exist ed the peril of priva te monopolies which can
never be
tolera ted because of their contr ol of the neces sities of life. 132
The economic problem of his day was not what changes shoul d be
made in
the German economy but how the state could resto re her sound
pre-w ar
133
economy.
Prote ctive tarif fs were necessar,y to reviv e ma~ home indus tries

l26Ibid., p. 46, an obvious refere nce to Gener al Erich von Luden
dorff and
his ideas of the total state .

-

l27Ib id., p. 53.

-

128Ib id., p. 58.
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13Dr bid., p. 61.
131Ib id.,
129Ib id., p.

p. 61132Ib id., p. 48.

-
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but the fundamental difficulty was Germany's reliance on foreign capital which
134
;.TaB making her increasingly Ita Colonial territory of international capital."
German industry could never be sound until it was wholly controlled by
Germans.

He did not question the continuance of reparation payments, as much

as this made recovery impossible, because this was a political and not
economic question and one which had nothing to do with justice, but with
power of which Germany was bereft. 13.5
Although Germany had been industrially autonomous before the war she had
been dependent upon the importation of foreign foodstuffs. 136 Her acceptance
of the "monstrous conditions of peace lt forced by the blockade which was to
serve as the chief sanction employed in future international disputes meant
to Seeckt that Germany would be defenseless unless it had a self-sufficient
137
food supply.
This was a political consideration he maintained that was
138
In formulating a state agricultural poltcy, he
above all party bickering.
wrote, "Everything must be subordinated to the one objective; to the
restoration of

liber~

to the Empire by enabling it to

resources ••• n139

-

l34Ibid ., p. 4.5.
l3.5Ibid.

-

l36Ibid., p. 31.
l37Ibid., p. 32-33.
l3 8Ibid., p. 33.

-

-

l39Ibid ., p. 41.

li~e

on its own
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He believ ed that to achie ve this end the state must employ prote
ctive
tarif fs, loans , and credi ts but once the point of an adequate
suppl y unsupporte(
by impor ts was reach ed then this assis tance must be withdrawn. 140
When this
condi tion had been attain ed, he saw the normal task of the state
as being the
elimi natio n of surpl uses and the maintenance of price s and profi
ts adequ ate for
141
both produ cer and consumer.
He realiz ed that in pract ice this would be
diffi cult and that the state was powe rless to legis late prosp
erity, but he was
hopef ul that by conce ntrati ng on the indiv idual farme r's ini tiati
ve it would be
142
succe ssful.
He cited appro vingly the exper ience of the United State s as an
example of how the state was able to direc t l'Tith remarkable succe
ss the development of their farm econ~ along the lines of coope rative s. 14.3
example of what Seeck t meant by state interf erenc e for the natio
nal
welfa re was his solut ion to the problem of the large r Junke r
estat es in
144
north ern Germany.
The Peopl e t s Party , of which Seeek t became an elect ed
repre senta tive, was inexo rably opposed to aqy sugge stion that
they be split
An

Yet Seeck t's posit ion in this matte r was that large landh oldin
gs shoul d be
broken up if the" were not produ ctive and place d in the hands
of those who
would make them usefu l for the natio n, allud ing to the examp
le of Pruss ia in

-

l40rb id., p. 34-37.
l41Ib id., p. 34-5.

-.

l42Ibid ., p. 38-39.

-

l4.3Ib id. , p. 40.
l44Ibid ., p. 41.

-
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colonizing unused land.
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His application of the principles of national need

and historical development provides a fair example of his method of approaching
problems.
Seeckt understood that the problem of economic freedom was coupled with
that of social justice.

In this area, the state must achieve "the highest

possible well-being of the sum total of its citizena. 11

146

He pointed out that

this had nothing to do with the utopian idea of equal prosperity for all since
the natural human condition presupposed inequality.147 He affirmed that the
duty of the state was not to limit the competitive struggle which produces
wealth but to provide the means of Itself-help" by which the "general level of
well-beinglt might be raised by the weaker citizens themselves. 148
He realized, however, that modern developments in industrialization had
made it necessary for the state to undertake social services that formerly were
done by the economically stronger in the community.

In his opinion it was

"undesirable but unavoidable" that the state care for the Sick, the aged, arrl.
those unable to work, as well as to supervise the condi tiona of employment,
such as hours of work and child labor. 149 Seeckt limited the state's intervention in the social sphere with two principles.

The first was that direct aid

such as a dole to those in need was to be avoided so that the individual. did

54.
147Ibid.
148Ibid., p. 55.
146Ibid., p.

,0
not lose his incentive and become a permanent burden to society but that he be
cared for by his family, his neighbors, the local community, and, in particular,
worker's organizations.

1,0

The second principle was that social sel"'rices

should never exceed the ability of the taxp83'er to maintain them or the source
of aid, along with the state, would be irreparably harmed.

l~

He recognized

the difficulty in obtaining social justice without unbalancing economic
freed. om but his principles for achieving this are open to various interpretations.
The state had a reluctant role to play in the social welfare of the nation
but it had a positive obligation to be a promoter of its cultural forces.

The

first of these Was the ethical one of public morality in which both the state
and churches co-operated for their mutual
between religion, the individual's

~nefl t.

1" esponse

Seeckt distinguished

to the "supersensuous," and the

church, an historical institution which "held out the saving hand of dogma ••
to uncharted religious individualism.,,1'2

He saw no conflict hetween religion

and the state since both were concerned with a strong ethical spirit in
society.l'3

As far as the

cht~ches

were concerned, the rise of the national

states had occasioned the growth of state churches, a situation he deplored

-

l'Orbid., p.

57.

151Ibid ., p.

,8.

-

-

l'2Ibid. , p.

-

l'3Ibid ., p.

66.
69.
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because the state had no concern with doctrines and the church's interest was
beyond pOlitics. 154 In the promotion of religion the state must regard the
various churches with tolerance which, even if it was not one of the principles
of modern times, it would still have to be affirmed. 155
The state had the duty of promoting the work of religion and this meant of
the creeds in which it was emobided. 156 The only rese.r'Vation he attached to
this material assistance was the same that all citizens must observe, and that
was to foster the stability of the state.157 B.r calling Germany a Christian
state Seeckt meant that the state reflected the moralit.1 of its citizens and
not that the state was in any way Christian. 158 He recognized that churches
were "political associations" because they existed for the protection of their
coreligionists, and he saw the Roman Catholic Church in particular as having
international political significance. 16o The state, he believed, could
accommodate to this but the state must never forget that it alone was the "embod1ment, representati va and controller" of the spiritual interests of its

l54Ibid ., p. 68.

-

-

l55Ibid.

-

l56Ibid., p. 69.

-

157Ibid.

-

158 Ibid ., p. 70.

-

159Ibid.

-

160Ibid •
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people.

161

He concluded that conflict in this area would be avoided if both
162
realized that they were fulfilling the same duty but on different p1anee.
He makes no comment

~n

other ethical Groups, such as the Teutonic Christians or

the Masons, omitting them from any official place in the state.
Religion was a part of the citizen's formation but another equally
iJnportant area of that cultivation \las education.
the state

In education, as religion,

able to promote the material aspects but the non-material were
beyond its scope. 163 He believed that the state could ensure the development
w~

of students with average mentality but that it was incapable of instilling
genius into men of talent. 164 The most it could do was to provide opportunitie
for such individuals to reach their maximum 1imits.165 He believed that
education was not primarily meant for practical purposes but for the cultural
166
broadening of the entire person.
However, for the state, the most important
result of the classroom, was to stamp its students with the national
167
character.

16lIbid ., p. 71.

-

162Ibid.
163 Ibid ., p. 72.

164Ibid.,
-

p. 73.

165Ibid.
166 Ibid •

-

167Ibid., p. 74.
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He stated that the sole responsibllit,y for education must lie with the
state since it is as much an asset as its material resourees. 168 Seeckt
realized that from this claim there arose three

dange~sl

part,y politics being

introduced into the schools, governmental bureaucrae.y destroying the spirit of
education by its insistance on a deadening uniformit,y, and the temptation to
make education a state monopolY closing off equally valid education from other
169
The higher the eduoational level, the more the state should withsources.
draw its direct oontrol leaving the initiative to the discretion of the school
officials themselves. 170 He saw this as being especially true in respect to
allowing universities complete freedom to do as they saw fit, because they
played such a distinctive role in molding societ,y.

ln

It Should be noted that

nowhere does he give any state institution so much freedom.
Science likewise he plaoed beyond the control of the state since ita
results are for the benefit of all mankind. 172 Although the state wOlud
ultimately derive some practical benefit from it, soienoe existed for its own
173
It was international but it cryuld only develop in a national setting
sake.

l68 Ibid ., p • 71.

..........

l69Ibid ., p. 74-76.

..........
l71Ibid.,
..........
172Ibid.,
..........
l73Ibid.,
..........

l70rbid., p • 77.
p • 78.
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and the state had the duty to foster this part of its spiritual strength.

174

Art was more "earthbound" than science since it was a reflection of the time in
which it existed and, hence, political life strongly influenced and sometimes
175
Writing especially reflected political conditions, and the state
used it.
must not make the mistake of trying to interfere or set up an official
176
literature.
Nor should it attempt to censor literature directly since
enough laws existed for the protection of "public order and security.tt177
He characterized censorship boards as absurdities because their members could
not help but be prejudiced and they should in any case be rendered superfluous
178
by the existing legal code and the magistrates.
The strong state, he
believed, did not have to be afraid of Criticism or laughter and those who
"pander to the sensation of the moment will quickly disappear. 11179 In particular, political interference, with its party politics and bureaucratic
faVOrites, was to be avoided although the state within limitations (to support
"'circenses'" the state had to have enough '" panis' It) should endeavour to help
180
the artist.

174Ibid •

175Ib1d., p. 80-81.
176Ibid ., p. 83.
177Ibid •

178Ib1d ., p. 84.
-

l80rbid., p. 85.86.
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In his discussion of the spiritual and creative forces of German culture
he included what he called the state's "humanitarian duties. n181 In this
section he spoke of the charitable institutions of private individuals and of
the churches, because of modern economic developments, passing into the
impersonal hands of the state social services. 182 However, he was proud of the
fact that the state had incorporated wi thin itself the "historic mission of the
Church" in the preservation of public health.

183

His consideration of this

topic omitted its negative side such as hospitals and old people's homes and
instead concentrated on the Single positive aspect of physical exercise.

He

felt that the contemporary enthusiasm for sports was a healthy substitute for
forbidden militar,r physical training and should be supported by the state for
that reason. 184 He regretted that so much emphasis was placed upon individual
honors and less on team competition which he believed was better training in th
duties of the citizen. 185
Seeckt's political philosophy was not composed of aI\Y'th.ing original or
startling.

The evolutionary and historicist ideas were common to m8f\Y' writers

of his time.
discipline.

So too was the nationalism and the heavy emphasis on social
His adaptation of laissez faire economics to the twentieth century

18lIbid., p. 87.

-

182Ibid.

184rbid., p. 89.

185

~.,

p. 90.

situation is almost sentimental in its fervor.

The distinctive facet of his

thought lies not in its content but in the manner in which it is expressed.
He was an epigrammatic writer, expressive in his allusions, and giving the
l;n:press:1.on of a great breadth of knowledge.

He had a sense of humor and of

satire coupled with a sincerity that engendered interest on the part of the
reader.

H.ls thought was authoritarian but he was no fanatic.

a crude or shallow person, these were not harmless ideas.
Seeckt, they had style and point.
De Gaulle, but never of a Hitler.

In the mind of

As expressed by'

A reader might imagine them in the mind of a

--

.

-CHAPTER III
THE PHILOSOPHY OF FORCE
Seeokt's belief in a universal law of the asoendency of the strongest in a
competitive world made him, in his political writings, concerned above all
with matters of force.

In the post-war oontext of Oeman disunity and

isolation, it was not strange that a soldier writing of contemporary political
problems should focus his attention primarily upon the state's ability to
preserve itself through its police and militar,r powers.

His practioal approaoh

to such questions resulted in the point of view that in reality the state was
not oonstituted in

SCllt9

abstract legality, but that its legitimacy derived

from the maintenance of its existence against internal and external enemies.
For these reasons, power relationships within and without the state were of
particular importanoe in his thought.

And the logical conclusion of these

ideas was his conception that the well-ordered state was a power state whose
sovereignt.1 and well-being existed onl1 through the presence and exercise of
force.

In setting forth his ideas on these matters, the present chapter will

summarize his justification of force as law, the use of the state's enforcement powers I the primacy of foreign policy, the necessity' of war, the universal
obligation of military service, and finally, his concrete appraisal of the
Versailles Peace Treaty and analysis of the European situation of his day.
Seeckt's philosophy of force rested upon his belief that actual power and
not theoretical right bestows authority.

57

Fundamental in this regard and

58
consistent with his historicism was his denial of the existence of aqy absolute
1
or transcendent justice "raised above might, time, and the State. rt
Laws did
ideas but instead found their origin and
2
interpretation in the needs of time and place.
His belief that the only
not depend upon such

metap~sical

universal law was that of conflict and change led naturally to the conclusion
that there existed no absolute standard of public moralit,y or legality to which
the state must conform.

For him laws and rights were simply the creation of

the state's power and he stated quite plainly that "Code, law, and justice are
derived from Might and are created b.Y it.,,3
In the last chapter it was stated that he believed there were individual
rights other than those granted by the state.

However, these rights were

contingent upon the approval of the state, because, he said, if the state did
not order society there would exist only "the naked struggle of individual
entities and the eventual "domination of the stronger. 1I4

His idea was that

there existed no such thing as law or justice unless there was the power to
enforce them. 5 He cited Niccolo Macchiavelli's

lHans von Seeckt,

!!!! Future .2! .:!!h! German

!h! Prince,

which he called

$n!pire (London, 1930) p. 90.

2Ibid., p. 911 ltV-That has become of the supersensuousness of Justice when
lSH in~s country is administered on the principles of the Emperor Justinian,
and a few hundred miles farther East the ISH of a Communist State obtains?"
3Ibid., p. 90.
4Ibid., p. 130.

5Ibid.,
of it

p. 90:

0i1iY Might.

l

"Within the country there is only State justice; outside
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"entertaining and instructive even today," to the effect that good laws were
made possible by good soldiers.

6 Seeckt outlined a consistent theory of power

ba3ed on the thesis that power not only precedes law but that "right and law
emanate from r1ight."

7

He did not mean by this that power necessarily effected good laws nor that
the State was free to make arry kind of law it desired.

Since the state

represented the nation, that is, the common interests of the people, he
realized that there was an implicit restriction on the state to legislate onlY
in the interest of the nation.

"Law," he said, "only has this force

[iegaliti/, as long as it is in being, that is to say, is in accord with the
thought and life of the people • • • • "

8

How~ver,

the important factor here was

not the will of the people, which in any case was disunited, ill-informed .. and
inarticulate, but the power of the state leadership to initiate measures
belie'red to be in the common interest.

The very existence of the state

depended upon such authority and its enforcement.

He considered it natural for

the citizen to resist the state's authority and that civic compulsion was
necessary.9

To put his thought more directly, the state theoretically derived

6Ibid. , p. 129.

7Ibid.,
8

-

p. 131.

Ibid., p. 92.

9Ibid., p. 92.

-
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its authorit.y from its people but practically this authority was directed upon
the people for their common welfare.
His nationalism identified the state with the people to the extent that in
his mind the state came to stand for the people.

In this connection he quoted

the Latin proverb that the common good is the highest law and that it would be
"a sham regard" for a legal principle to enforce a law that jeopardized the
10
good of the State (ideally the community).
Apparently he did not conceive
the national good and the security of the state as ever being in conflict.
The right ot revolution was not one that he acknowledged.

He believed in

evolution and was extremely fearful of what abrupt changes might bring.

The

highest principle was the security of the state and obedience to whatever
measures were tound necessar,y to maintain it.
A sense of balance in the relationship between state power and individual
freedom was lacking in Seeckt's thought.

The authority of the state was

absolute preoisely in order to ensure the treedan of the citizen.

Some

limitations, most notably economic, were laid down by Seeckt, but there is
certainly little preCiseness about them and in general all conflicts between
treedom and authority are resolved in the state's favor.

Although he said that

emergency regulations caused by a state of crisis should be removed as soon as
possible, the reason for this was that such laws were the s,ymptom of
governmental weakness and only disguised more fundamental weaknesses.

-

lOrbid., p. 92.

-

llIbid., p.

94.

11

61
It was precisely for this reason that Seeckt found the Weimar Republic
lacking in its representation of the Reich.

The parliamentar,r system obscured

the full power of the state in relying too heavily on temporary expedients.
Under the Weimar system laws were the result of compromise on the part of the
various political parties and this was in no way a substitute for a "clear-cut
State will, embodied in a personality.tt12 The state in its goal of embodying
the common welfare had to be above party intrigues or else it would encourage
endless resistance to its decrees.
The State, enacting its laws and enforcing obedience to them by the
instruments of its Might, is in the true sense of the words, social
and democratic--for which reason neither the State nor the police
are social-democrats. • •• The possibility of a party political
attitude and the justifiable or unjustifiable fear of it, accounts
in part for the dislike and resentment shown towards the State and
its officers of public order, an indic.ation how necessary in a wellordered State is the effort to put the State above party. 13
This was the ideal, because he believed the government leaders naturally came
from the most powerful element in the nation, but the more they transcended

th~~

own interests, the more power they would have, and consequently, the more they

would be able to represent all interests, powerful or not.

ImpliCitly, then,

Seeckt believed in the necessity of popular acceptance of the regime.

And he

was so sure of the lack of public confidence in the Weimar regime that he
counselled a moratorium on legislation so as not to further weaken the state
idea in the minds of the people. 14 For Seeckt, the chief crime of the Republic

-

l2Ibid., p. 93.

-

13Ibid., p. 131.
14Ibid., p. 93.

~as
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that it did not use its power as a state, either for good or bad, and hence

had no right to existence.
Seeckt questioned whether a parliamentary system was able to govern
German;r.

His philosophy of government made clear that nothing short of

constitutional changes were necessary if a complete breakdown in the Weimar
Republic were to be avoided.

To him the basic flaw in the Weimar system was

the necessity of basing government on a cooperation of rival parties, exactly
the point that most theorists see as the fundamental strength of democracy.
In his view however, such a system could not work in Germaqy even from the
standpoint of legislation since the full power of the state was not behind its
laws.

He acknowledged that the parliamentary system worked in England and in

other countries but he maintained that it was wrong to attempt to institute it
in GermanY since its development was entirely different.
No matter what the government, the question of the implementation of
policy by the police was vital.

He was concerned about the numerous criticisms

of the police ,because this struck at the very foundation of the state's
authority.l' He believed one of the reasons for the general unpopularity of
the police was that the Weimar government, in its weaknesses, was prOMUlgating
too

many

laws although he does not specifY which laws he found objectionable.

A second reason was that of federal control of the ordinary police which he

-

l'Ibid., p. 132.

-

16Ibid •

16

-
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felt should rather originate and be controlled b,y the local authorities since
they should be as close to the people as possible.

17 On the other hand,

certain departments, and he named only those dealing with major criminal
investigations, should be as far as possible centralized, even !Ito a certain
extent internationalized; not for any political object, only for its own
ends."

18

Last of all, he fo1t it was a great mistake that every "verboten"

sign in Germany should carry the imprint of the Reich's emblem.

19

In connection with police affairs, Seeckt devotes some space to the
relationship of the military and internal order.

The armed forces are trained

for the purpose of waging war aga:i. nst the external enemies of the state and
their use as police would seriously compromise their standing with the people
and undermine for a long time the authority of the police.

20

In the extraordi...

nary situation in which the police are helpless in maintaining the existence of

the state, then the army must wage civil war which is "the most unhappy, and
to a soldier, most distasteful" using full military means to obtain their
21
object.
However, he asserted unequivocably that even with full knowledge of
the many serious objections,t1 ••• the ar:my must, if the necessities of the
State demand it, be prepared to take this ungrateful task upon its shoulders

17Ibid., p. 133.

-

2Orbid., pp. 134-135.
-

19Ibid., pp. 132-33.

-

21Ibid ., p. 135.
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and stand the consequences."

22

However, he insisted that the state leadership

be under no illusions that the army could ever allow itself "to be employed as
23
party troops."
This is the theoretical justification for the use of the Reichswehr in the
1923 separatist uprisings in Saxony and Bavaria.
the

govern~entts

Seeckt's stricture against

use of the military to maintain the position of a particular

party is also the partial explanation for Seecktts attitude in the Kapp Putsch
of 1920.

His adamant attitude about party politics also throws light on the

meaning of his reply to Ebert's question about whom the Reichswehr supnorted.

24

The Reichswehr was a military organization which obe,yed the orders of its
Commanding General who was subordinate to the President of the Reich through
the Reichswehr Minister.
presidents.

The military chain of command was inflexible even for

But as his action in 1920 showed the military commander was

responsible for his interpretation of the direction he received fram his
civilian superiors and if he found them objectionable his recourse was
resignation and not insubordination.
The armed forces existed however for a much broader purpose than internal
security.

They were an integral part of Seeckt's philosophy of force in the

realm of foreign relations.

He regarded foreign policy as operating from a

position of power completely divorced from any notion of morality or legality.

22Ibid ., p. 134.

-

23rbid.

24See Chapter Five for fuller treatment of this topic.
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He defined the conduct of foreign affairs as being a combination of diplomacy
and the militar,y.25

Because foreign relations were based upon power, the goal

of Germany's foreign policy must be "the restoration of Germany as a Might
26
state."
He believed that treaties and alliances, just as laws within the
state, were meaningless without the power to implement them.

"Alliances

between States should be regarded entirely from the point of view of Might
policy,

and whatever else the treaties contain, their chief value, often their

only value, lies in their milit~J clauses."27 Seecktts position was that a
state relied not on the good will that was expressed in a pact but on its
worth which could only be translated into military terms relative to political
ends.
These political aims naturally

det~r.mine

the staters foreign polia,y.

Seeckt denied the proposition that domestic policy was more important than
foreign relations since to him the,r were two different aspects of the state.
Neither had primacy over the
of fostering state strength.

oth~r

28

because both dealt with the political goal

Rooever, he maintained this to be true only in

the case of a strong national state whose people and leaders were unaffected by
outside interests and influences. 29 He believ(,d that a strong nationalism

25Seec kt, Future

.2!

-

26Ibid ., p. 153.

-

27Ibid., p. 151.

-

28 Ibid. , p. 145.

-

29Ibid., pp. 145-46.

Empire, p. 107.
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inevit.ably resulted in strengthening the state's relations with foreign
30
countries and waR actually a factor in maintaining peace.
The worst enemy of a strong foreign policy was mistaken internationalism.
The idea of an economic union was repugnant to Seeckt's nationalism because
the internal economic foundation of the state's independence would be
influenced by the consideration of foreign economic needs. 3l State
sovereignty demanded that each country serve their own economic interests and
that this was the goal of foreign policy.
destroyed the freedom of the militarily
oppression of the economically strong

International. economic ties

we~~

state since there would be "the

the politically stronger, for in this
32
adventure, as in every other, Might rules.
Seeckt :')elieved that Germany
~!

I'

would suffer in such a situation because this type of association would have
"the purpose and the object of conserving the status quo in Europe, and is
therefore to the interests of those who believe this Eurooe and the world of
33
tod~ to be politically the best available."
Seeckt found the thought
repugnant.
There was a further danger to national strength in international finance
which was more interested in profits than in national well-being.

-l
3 Ibid. ,
-

3Orbid., p. 148.
p.

150.

32Ibid ., p. 148.
33Ibid ., p. 149.

-
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on this that, "It is impossible to shut one's eyes to the fact that the
intertang1ed, international monetary powers and monetary interests are
beginning to acquire a super-State influence. 1f

34

The belief that such invest-

ments would lead to the avoidance of war was mistaken in Seeckt's view because
he realized that such economic arrangements could also very well be the cause
35
of war.
Seeckt was not a mere xenophobe but he had no faith in any other
safeguard to the security of a state but its power.
but he appreciated that

Germ~'a

He was not an isolationist

onlY chance of regaining her position as a

great power was to avoid good wishes and concentrate steadfastly on the goal of
force.
In attaining this goal, Germany must be aware that in its weakened, postwar condition any alliance it might make with a stronger country would be
ultimately disadvantageous, because weak states in doing so place themselves in
the position of being lithe stronger's vassal who can be dropped when
36
convenient."
He did not believe that isolation or neutraliu.r was a practical
solution to the international problems of a small state since such policies are
only intelligible when founded on force and the will to use it.

Germany's

course had to be different because she was in reality a strong power who
temporarily had been deprived of her power by the peaoe treat.r. 37 To regain

34.!2.!2:.,
35Ibid •

r!
p. 1;:;10.

36Ibid., p. 152.
-

-

37Ibid •
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her position as a world leader, Germany would have to use diplomacy to get rid

ot the military and economic restrictions by which the Allies had hoped to
destroy her atter the war.
He did not describe the course German toreign policy was to take in the
restoration to the status ot a great power.

The tact that he was one ot the

originators and strongest advocate of the military and eoonomic allianoe with
Russia, demonstrates how he translated his theories into action. 38 The key to
suoh an alliance is to be tound not simply in the tact that both Germany and
Russia were outcasts and weak states in comparison to the Western Powers, but
in his understanding of the nature of diplomacy. It was not based on legal
permanence but on tluctuating basis ot national needs. A state must not teel
bound to observe the provisions of a treaty whioh was no longer to its
advantage and in moral justitication ot this position he wrote that "Treaties,
alliances, pacts, associations, are, ot course, not made for all eternity, and
the reservation 'rebus sic stantibus' in allot them is an understood secret
cause
1
• • • • "39
Seeckt was not being cynical in this statement.

It was a natural outgrowt

ot his world view and his extreme nationalism in which laws and treaties were
no more than a "scrap ot paper" in relation to the tar greater importance of
national security.

For Seeckt, there were no higher values than those of the

38Hans U. Gatzke, Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany (Baltimore,
1954), pp. 87-88.
-- 39Seeckt" Future of E!DPir!l, p. 149.

Reich.

It would have been hypocritical of him to have disguised in flowery

language his belief in the primacy of national self-interest.

He understood

the importance of world opinion but the first duty of each state was its own
securit,y and interests.
Soeckt was a believer in Machtpolitik from conviction and he found no
possible alternative to it.

In his most thoughtful work, Moltke, he

considered at length the philosophical implications of his policy of force
which he derived from Emmanuel Kant's discussion of the possibility of
eternal peace.

Seeckt's reading of Kant was that although eternal peace was an

extremely remote possibility for mankind it should not be dismissed on that
account because "if all human acts are subjected to the categorical imperative
based on freedom, then this one cannot be subordinated in an indbridual
instance to the principle of opportunism and cleverness.,t

40

Even though Kant

lauded peace as one of the ideals of mankind, he realized, Seeckt thought, that
struggle 8.nd conflict was the natural condition of man.41

It was Seecktt s

understanding of the human c ondi tion that served as his chief justification of
following a course of power politics.
According to Seeckt, Kant saw war as one of the competitive elements in
the development of the natural world.

Even ;llore, Seeckt saw' war as being

something noble and dignified because Kant showed it was founded in human

40Hare

von Seeckt, Moltke,

..!!:!! -.V....or;.,bi=l-..d

(Berlin, 1931), p.

104.
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nature.

42 Seeckt was committed to the belief that war was both profoundly

human and a good which effected the best in man.

Hence, he saw pacifism as

being an unnatural sentiment and unrealisticallY abstracted from the actual
circumstances of life.

Beyond the philosophical there is a religious

justification for war as a positive good.

Moltke's life showed, Seeckt wrote,

that a militar,y career and piet" go together and that the soldier takes his
vocation "not as a 'blind fighter for God, but in the full freedom of the
Christian man. ,,43 Seeckt believed strongly that war was part of the moral
order.
Seeckt ended his discussion with Kant's view of the possibilit,r of man
renouncing war by quoting him as saying that the whole question of eternal
peace is about an ideal which probablY has no foundation in fact. 44 He agreed
with Kant that as a dream it was certainly a very appealing one.

But it was

for this very reason that Seeckt was unalterablY opposed to this ideal which he
considered potentially capable of destrqying the state.

The vision of peace,

he believed, sapped the strength necessar,y to meet actual conditions confronting the state. 45
In his Gedanken eines Soldaten, Seeckt again dismissed the theoretical

42 Ibid • , p. 105.

43Ibid ., p. 103.
-

44Ibid. , p. 105.

45

-Ibid., p. 109.
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position of pacifism.

He reduced all pacifist arguments to the question of the

perfectability of man.
demonstrated one

w~

Since this was something which could not be

or the other, he was not interested in the argument.

He

believed men had to operate not on the possibilit,y of same future development
but in the light of present reality in which war was prominantly in the nature
of things.

46

As in his discussion of political theor.1, Seeckt, the student of

Machiavelli, here presented himself as the thoroughgoing realist operating
within the liMits of actual present possibilities.
Although Seeckt regarded pacifism as Germaqy's most insidious enemy, he
was not unaware of the terrifying prospects of modern warfare.

He knew well

vThat the four years of fighting had cost Germany and in partioular that all
future wars would be total.

It is understandable then, that Seeckt oalled the

soldier, the man whose profeSSion was war, the only true pacifist. 47 He at no
time gave

a~

indication that he conceived of the militar,y in romantic or

adventurous terms.

His attitude reflected a belief in his vocation as a career

of service and self-sacrifice with few compensations.

The reason for the

armed forces was their employment in war, but to deoide upon this

c~ursewas

the gravest consequence.
Paoifism, he believed, did not arise from the terror of modern weapons

46Hans von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten (Berlin, 1929), p. 73.
47.!!?!s!., p. 75•
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beoause every past war had been horrible "even to the civilian."

48

HOTNever,

the state in its mission of promoting the well-being of the Reich, cannot
allow itself to be moved by such considerations of modern weaponry and their
disasterous effects upon civilization.

As much as Seeckt understood the

consequences of modern war, he demanded that war, as a fact of life, must
always be reckoned with in state councils.

He lamented the unrealistic

atmosphere created by pacifism in his own time which branded as Itwar-mongerers ff
people who stated the simple fact, as Moltke had done, that war was an un49
avoidable evil out of which some good would always come.
Since war was a natural part of existence and played such a large part in
the history of the great pONers, Seeckt had no doubt that Germal1Y' lTlUst be
prepared to fight another war at some future date or cease to exist.
he did not believe in war for war's sake.

However,

Instead, as a soldier and a "true

pacifist,1I he realized how often politicians resorted to "Tar as a substitute
for realistic aims.

Seeckt corrected Clausewitz's statement which called war

the continuation of a political policy to read the "bankruptcy of that
50
policy."
He declared it was the positive moral obligation of statesmen to
strive for the reduction of the danger of war in the settling of disputes.

At

the least this should achieve, he hoped, limiting war to '" the great anti theses

48 Ibid.,

-

p. 74.

49Seeckt, Moltke, p. 107.
50seeokt, Gedanken, p. 74.
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of life. t ,,51 The attainable goal that he saw within the reach of mankind was t
52
rid the world of wars over purely political affairs.
Here as perhaps nowhere
else in his writings does Seeckt more strongly put the onus on the state's
leaders for the use of the philosophy of force.

He believed the responsibility

for waging war did not rest upon the conscience of the militar,y but upon their
political superiors.
The limitation of war was possible but not its complete elimination.

In

his eyes if the politiciana of the world really desired to mitigate the evils
of war, one practical possibility existed in the reduction of armaments. 53
There were two types of wars and both could be sharply reduced in number and
The f1rst were those between political governments and these could
54
be avoided at the conference table.
The second were those between peoples

magnitude.

caused by some spiritual conflict into which, for example, the First World

War had degenerated, could be avoided by reducing armaments which would lessen
the likelihood of their occurrence. 55 His fundamental objection to such plans
was the necessary disproportion of militar,r strength between countries.

This

could be overcome by the creation of a balance of armaments so that no one
56
state had superior forces in relation to a combination of other states.
Another practical. advantage of such a system, he believed, was the fact that it

-

51Ibid.
52Ibid., p. 76.

-

53Ibid., p. 74.

-

54Ibid., p. 75.

-

55Ibid., pp. 75-76.
56Ibid •
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would produce a feeling of secur1t.y, a prerequisite for times of neace and one
which did not exist in the Europe of his time.
Armament reduction did not mean to Seeckt the end of universal military
conscription.

He held that the ultimate basis for the defense of one's

countr,y in modern times was the principle of such militar,r training.

The

apparent contradiction in the reduction of armaments while retaining universal
militar,r training is explainable because Seeckt conceived of small, professiona
standing armies in all countries, with the population of the countr,y and all of
its material resources available and

re~

for use in the event that a war

developed which could not be ended in a short time.

However, he doubted the

possibility of limited warfare in the post-Napoleonic world.,7
Seeckt believed that the Treaty of Versailles only made another war more
likely.

"Peace treaties have replaced a Europe in which there were a few big

differences which statecraft has for decades contrived to bridge, by a new
Europe, in which

~lere

is a succession of unsolved problems, which it will be

difficult, if not impossible, to solve by' pacific means.lt,a Even though he
regretted this, Seeckt believed that there was little alternative other than
war in a world of unbalanced forces.

In arw event, he realized that Germany

would have to work for changes in the European power relationships.

Such a

stabilization had to be accomplished before there could be aqy hope for better

,7Seeckt, Landesverteidigung,
,SSeeckt, Future

.2! J:he

p. 30.

§metre, p. 157.
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times.
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In the Europe created at Versailles, Germany was faced with two alternatives.

Seeckt saw that a decision had to be made between becoming either a

satellite of France or of Russia.

Either choice meant the destruction of

Germany because it would become the battleground in the future war between East
60
and \1'est which he felt must eventually come.
He dismissed England as having
only a small role to play in the impending conflict because the innovations of
61
the submarine and the airplane ended her as a great power.
He saw France as
Germ&r\Y's natural eneIllY' and any rapprochement with her would in etfect mean the
62
lherefore, he concluded, Germany's only wt13' out
end of German sovereignty.
of its dilemma was close economic and military cooperation with RUSSia based
63
upon a realistic foreign policy.
If as a result Germa~ became a strong
national power again, Seeckt believed there would be nothing to fear from
64
Russian Communism.
Seeckt insisted that the German people be aware that the;r would in all
probability have to fight another war to solve their problems.

He thought that

the "war guilt" clause of the treaty had morally confused many Germans.

-

He

59Ibid., pp. 158-159.
60Hans von Seeckt, Deutschland zwischen ~ ~ ~ (Hamburg, 1933), p. 8.

62Ibid., p. 28.
63Ibid., p. 34.
-

61Ibid ., pp. 16-18.

64Ibid., pp. 40..43.
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castigated the hypocrisy of the Allies in persistinF to blame Germany for the
65
1914 war, even though historical documents had been published to the contrary.
He did not dispute, however, that because Germany lost the war it had to pay
the consequences of being weak.

But Seeckt emphasized that

had nothing to do with moral guilt.

~Jch

an acceptance

66 Seeckt's thought placed the interests of

the nation above all other values, and in modern total war this was especially
true because its very
be put as

s~ing

s1~vival

was at stake.

His message to his people might

that, no matter what country had the responsibilit,y for

startin? the next war, Germans must have the moral fibre to do whatever is
necessar,y to win.

Seeckt based Germany's future on whether it understood

correctly the ethics of force.

65::;eeckt, Future

2!

Empire, p. 157.

66~.J pp. 159-160.

CHAPTER IV

THE REICHSWEHR
More than any other individual Seeckt was responsible for the preservation
of the defeated German

~

as an efficient fighting force in spite of the

destructive limitations imposed upon it after the war.
Chief of the

Arm1 Command, he was determined

In his capacity as

to actively plan and control the

development of the Reichswehr, leaving nothing to chance because of the Allied
conditions.

1

He considered his main tasks in accomplishing this to be the

neutralization of the treaty's various harmful restrictions and the preparation
of a cadre

a~

for expansion when the opportunity presented

itself~

2

From a

purely militar,r standpoint his work was successful in that the Reichswehr was
able to make the future transition into Hitler's Wehrmacht and its total
rearmament in 1935 without changing his basic policies.

In a wider sense,

however, his work was meaningless because the German army thereafter allowed
itself to become the instrument of a ruthless opportunist who brought
destruction not only to it but to the Whole of the Geman nation.

The next

chapter will examine how Seeckt failed to solve the political problems facing
the military of the nascent Republic which proved so fateful for German

IHans von Seeckt, _';';';;'';;';';;';;;';;';;.;..;;.;0
Die Reichswehr
(Leipzig, 1933), p. 7.
...
2

-Ibid., p. 30.
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democracy.

The present chapter will confine itself to an examination of

Seeckt's significant military ideas such as the plan of the Reichswehr's
development, the necessity of universal conscription, the principle of leadership, the lessons learned from the First Hor1d 1tlar, and the anticipated form
of future wars.
To understand the character of Seeckt's Reichswehr it is necessary to
begin with the confusion and uncertainty of the sixteen months preceding his
assumption of command.

In his book, published in 1933, dealing with the

creation and policies of Germany's new

~, ~

_R.ei.c.h.BW.-e.hr_, Seeckt described

the situation faCing the provisional government upon the termination of
hostilities as a dual crisis of internal disorder and external pressure on
Germany's borders. 3 Under such conditions there was a pressing need for a
mili tary organization immediately adequate to the task of insuring the new
government's stability.

However, in Seeckt's view, the primary consideration

which guided the military was not the maintenance of a particular regime but
the preservation of the nation's unity.4 In the desperate post-war situation
Seeckt credited the Freikorps with having saved Germa~ trom dissolution. 5 He
did not allude to any direct connection of these groups with either the
government or its military.

3Ibid., p. 13.

-

4Ibid ., p.

5n l!.d.

14.

However, it is known that when the Imperial Arrrr:r

19
ceased to exist with the desertion of General Lequis' group in Berlin on
Christmas Eve 1918, the General. Staff with the knowledge of the government
decided upon raising volunteer bodies which would obey their orders. 6
This was the genesis of the Friekorps which were used

~

Gustav Noske, the

newly appointed Defense Minister, to bring about a relative pacification of the
country.

These organizations were given some legality when the National

Assembly, for whom Seeckt prepared a memorandum, passed the law of March 1919,
which created the four hundred thousand man Provisional Reichswehr.

The best

the Freikorps were then absorbed into this Reichswehr as brigades.

The March

Reichswehr was short-lived, however, because in June Germaqr accepted the
entirely different conditions imposed

~

the peace treaty.

In July the

government constituted the Preparatory Commission for the Peace Army with
8
Seeckt as President with the task of planning for the necessary changes. At
this critical time Seeckt suffered a heart attack and the actual work of
setting up the new Reichswehr was carried out b,y others. 9 He returned to duty
in October 1919 as head of the Truppenamt from which he would be promoted in

!2!!2

6Walter Gor1itz, Der Deutsche Generalst&b.
(Frankfurt am Main, 1950), p. 300.
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1Ibid., p. 305.
8Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Histo~ of the German~ Since the Armistice,
trans. Eileen R. T~lor (Zurich, 19 9):-p:-)45.
---

9G~r1itz, Genralstab, p. 311.
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Harch 1920 as Chief of the High Command.
In this position he was responsible for the i.mplementation of the military
clauses of the fifth part of the Versailles Treaty by which the reconstitution
of the German army was bound.

The army was to be reduced to a hundred

thousand men of whom four thousand were to be officers.

The length of service

for officers was to be twenty-five years and the enlistment of troops was to
be for twelve years.

The new army was divided into two arll\V cOIlL'nands which

together composed seven infantry and three cavalry divisions.

Certain weapons

were denied to it such as aircraft, heavy artillery, tanks, and armored cars,
and all other weapons were limited to specific quantities.

The Great General

Staff was abolished and plans for war or provisions for German mobilization
were forbidden.

Conscription or any form of military training was prohibited.

All fortifications were subject to Allied approval and periodic inspection.
The Allied Military Commission was made sole interpreter of these provisions
and the manner of their fulfillment.

In effect, Germany's power to undertake

The question for Seeckt was whether such an army
10
could be made capable of defending Germa.t:tV from attack.
another war was abolished.

Fourteen years after its inception, Seeckt described the Reichswehr as
certainly not the ideal army for Germany but one that was acceptable for the
present and necessary for the future. ll While many of his fellow officers had
declined to take any part in the creation of the post-war restricted army,

10Seeckt, Reichswehr, p. 29.
11Ibid., p. 33.

-
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Seeckt had championed it on the grounds that even its imperfect existence was
the first requirement for German security since its weaknesses could be
remedied later.

The immediate task was to create as effective an instrument of

state as possible within treaty limitations in such a way that it was ready for
12
expansion and development whenever that was possible.
To accomplish this he
fel t i t was necessary to draw upon the spirt t of the imperial army as the

He defined his basic aim as the reconstruction of
13
the previous German arnr;y in a new form.

source for the Reiohswehr.

From the first, Seeokt was convinoed that the militar,r clauses of the
treaty were intended to destroy the German army b.y attacking its traditions
and spirt t.

This assault on the spiritual foundations of the arJTtY by physical

restriction was embodied in four points:

the novel introduction of a German

mercenar,y army, the dissolution of the Great General Staff, the denial of
modern weapons, and the forbidding of universal militar,r training.14

The

reduotion in numbers and the large percentage of cavalry to the rest of the
Reichswehr did not worr,y Seeokt as much as these four provisions.

The material

defeots in the new German Army could be repaired relatively easily at a later
time, but the loss of its spiritual quality might never be replaced.

Conse-

quently, it was preCisely this spiritual element in the militar,r that he was

12 Ibid •

-

l3 Ibid ., p. 13.

14Ibid., pp. 2l-27.
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determined the Allies would never crush.
Seeckt's organization of the Reichswehr.
By

force

This idea was the primary source for
15

the spirit of the old German Army, Seeckt meant the interior motivating

~1ich

the German

gives &n1 body its distinctive personality, which in the case of

~

was both its highly efficient organization and its instantaneou

capabilities of mobilizing its offensive power.

16

The victors aware the,r could

not destroy the German military spirit, consequently attempted to make this
spirit incapable of actio:1.

He was certain that the Reichswehr had

successfu~

neutralized the harmful purpose of the four key provisions.
Another aspect of the militar,r spirit was its tradition.

The uniquely

German military experience was founded in its intimate union with the nation
17
and its history of service to the Reich.
Seeckt believed that the new ~
must in some way continue the traditions of the old.
to construct an

~

A1 though Seeckt was bound

within certain narrow limits, there was much he could do

in the matter of continuing German militar,r tradition.

An example of his

preservation of continuity was the question of the Reichswehr uniform.

He

pointed out how important the uniform was in making the soldier proud of
belonging to a special community and also its role in being the symbol with
which the German people will be able to identifY themselves. 18 For both

-

15Ibid ., p. 7.
16rbid., -p. 9.

-

l7 Ibid ., p. 8.
18Ibid ., p. 49.
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reasons the field-gray greatcoat of l..vorld Har I was retained.

The uniform

served, he concluded as the badge of the inner community not only of the
l9
Reichswehr but of all Germans.
Seeckt emphasized the identification of the nation with the army as one of
the guiding factors in the formation of the Reichswehr.

The preservation of

tradition was the chief means of insuring that when the treaty restrictions
were lifted the army would once again assume its respected role in German
affairs~

20

In an apparent reference to illegal nationalistic and paramilitary

organizations, he stressed that by the preservation of tradition people would
understand more easily that the Reichswehr was the proper agency for national
21
defense.
There could be no separation of the Reichswehr from the German
people.
Seeckt's regard for tradition was partly inspired

by

what he called "the

psychology of the milit.ary."

By this he referred to the fact that both the

soldier and the civilian were

cons~ious

victories of the past.

of the great military heroes and

People must be able to identify the post-war army with

this tradition of greatness.

The means by which this was to be fostered was by
22
the preservation of past military customs.
This was not to become a blind acceptance of the past, however.

19Ibid ., p.

-

53.

21

57.

20Ibid ., p.

-Ibid • , p. 58.
22 Ibid ., p. 47.
-

It was a
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carefUl selection of traditions that were valuable militarily and evocative of
patriotism to the public.

However much Seeckt emphasized this need for

continuity in the military, he was well aware also of history's dynamic force
and the value of change.

He had been a member of the Great General Staff which

had taught him the fundamentals of war but which had prized nexibility in
23
relation to them.
His definition of the Reichswehr as the old army in a new
form indicated how his conservatism was balanced by progressive tendencies.

He believed that every organization had the tendency to become stagnant
and alien to the spirit of its time.

This is especially true of armies, he

wrote, whioh are by nature conservative since everything that they have learned
has been taught at great oost and it is impossible for them to forget suoh
things easily.

He concluded from. this that since military men view any

proposal of refrom as revolutiOnary, it takes a oatastrophe, such as the defeat
of 1918, for them to recognize and correct weaknesses that naturally corne to
exist wi th the passage of time. 24
The Reichswehr, he hoped, had taken advantage of the lessons taught by" the
war but their full implenlentation would have to wait until the lifting of the
treaty restrictions.

At the very beginning of his book on the Reichswehr he

stated his belief in an Hegelian-like "organic law of being" by which all
historical events beoome simultaneously oreative as well as destructive. 25

23Hans von Seeckt, Moltke,

!!a Vorbild

24Seeckt, Reichswehr, pp. 32-33.
25Ibid., p. 7.

-

(Berlin, 1931), pp. 81-84.

8,
Seeckt's philosophical evolutionism therefore could not regard eradication
as static and unchanging.

He believed the spirit was dynamically developable,
renewing itself and changing imperceptibly each day. 26 For exa,'nple, attempts
to integrate some of the monarchical traditions of the imperial army into the
Reichswehr proved failures. 27

In an apparent reference to the Allied Control

Commission he CM ticized those who suspected a. "plot" to restore the old army

.

28

because the Reichswehr was obviously and necessarily quite different.·
an original spiritual connnunity formed from the union of old and new.

It was
He

concluded that the spirit of the Reichswehr was continuing to develop and would
29
continue to do so.
By preserving the old, Seeckt meant keeping the army distinctively German

drawing upon past experience for espirit.2! corps, patriotiC national support,
and efficient military organization.

Those who find that this preservation of

tradition had sinister results for Germany have generally over-stated their
case by implying reactionary

mj~itarism

as the core of that tradition.

Telford

Taylor, for example, has written that, "The successful transmigration of soul
from the imperial

~ ~

to the Reichswehr caused a fatal fiaw in the

foundations of the Republic, and was a most fateful event in world history."

26Ibid ., p. 63.

-

27 Ibid ., p. 60.
28Ibid., p. 61.

-

29 Ibid • , p. 64.
30Telford Taylor t Sword and Swastika:
Reich (New York, 1952), p. 2u-.--

Generals and Nazis in the Third

-

--

30
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Leaving the political question for the next chapter, it would seem that what he
really meant to say ":ias that by retaining its pride and structure the new
German army developed into the strongest in Europe.

It was the beliet in the

philosophy of force, which was not limited to one country, that was dangerous
in the rearming of Germany and not the fact that the Reichswehr found strength
in its past traditions.
A more carefully thought out position is that the treaty restrictions were
responsible for the reactionary tendencies in the Reichswehr.
Stern in his

stu~

For instance,

of various military systems wrote that it was the treaty

which !tactually imposed upon Germazv a military system which practically
guaranteed the continued dominance of the old-time officer even in the army of
the new republic. ItJl Although this was to some extent not wholly the fault of
the treaty since no army may be organized without the leadership of experienced
soldiers, such criticism is well-founded.

Seeckt lamented the difficulty of

attracting and promoting younger officers in such a restricted organization. J2
Seeckt's main aim then was to fashion something that was viable and not
venerable and it was precisely because he succeeded that the Reichswehr became
an agressive instrument in the service of Hitler.

The real danger to peace was

31Frederick Martin Stern, ~ Citizen.!!!!!1L (New York, 1956), p. 94.
32Seeckt, Reichswehr, p.

65.
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not found in a corrupt military "soul" but in the political direction.
Seeckt labored at preserving, developing, and broadening a distinctively
German military spirit for the young Reichswehr conscious that this was one of
the prerequisites for a

strong~.

which this work was to be carried on.

The Allies had determined the framework iJ
But Seeekt never pretended that he was

satisfied with the general terms of the treaty and the type of army it afforded
his country.

Nor did he hide the fact that his ultimate goal was a modern army

on the same footing with those of other large nations.

He believed it to be thE

duty of the government and the Reichswehr Ministry to strive for the treaty's
revision and he felt it unjust and unrealistic for the Allies to try to maintait
them.

His main argument was that these provisions of reducing Germany's arntV

was tied to the presumption of a general. European disarmament which had proved
unfounded and that the Allies would in the near future have to relent. 33

His

skirting of some of the restrictions was so limited in scope as to be negligiblE
in retrospect.

It seems to be a fair judgment that the treaty's military

points were effectively maintained.
The German army ceased to exist as a major fighting force, and no one
had to worry about actual war with Germany for many years to come.
The occasional evasions were made much of at a later date; and people
then talked as though the disarmament clauses of the treaty had
either never been observed or were of no value. In fact they
achieved their purpose so long as they remained in force.34

33Ibid., p. 17.

-

34A• J. p. Taylor, ~ Origins of ~ Second World ~ (New York, 1939)

p.

42.
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Seeokt attempted by relatively unsuccessful subterfuge to offset the four
points of the treaty which he felt were manifestly intolerable if Germany were
to provide for her seCurity.

He did so in the belief that a country had the

moral duty "in spite of and together with treaties" to protect herself and that
the Allies, in such documents as the Kellogg Pact, had recognized such a right
to self-defense.

35 The first of these restrictions against which he schemed

was that Germany was saddled with a mercenary army in which the nation was
barred from participation.

At the beginning of 1923, under the pressure of the

French occupation of the Ruhr, he began an experiment with a clandestine
mili tia.

The number of men involved in the "Black Reichswehr" affair was

approximately fifty thousand and they were disbanded at the end of the year
because discipline and military effectiveness were impossible under the
circumstances.
The second limitation was the outlawing of universal military training.
After the difficulties with the Arbeitertruppe auxiliaries nothing further was
done to expand the army

illega~.

However, Seeckt continued to emphasize the

importance of national military training and maintained that the defense of
36 For the time being he was content to foster
GeI'ma.IW was hopeless without it.
sports and organizations that taught skills, such as rifle or aviation clubs,
anything that was aimed at keeping the youth of the nation physically fit.

35Hans von Seeckt, .!h! Future 2f. .!:.!:!!! German Empire (London, 1930), p. 136.
36Hans von Seeckt, Landesverteidiguns (Berlin, 1930), p. 10.
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The third restriction was the liquidation of the Great General Staff.
idea of the Allies had been to destrqy the efficiency of the General Staff

The

qy

decentralizing its tasks, but it was obvious that some organization so vital to
the modern

a~,

would have to assume its functions.

The continuation of the

major part of the Staff's activities by the Allied approved Truppenamt was
quietly done but on such a small scale for the tiny army that when Hitler began
his expansion for the Wehrmacht there were not nearly enough men who could
qualify to undertake staff Positions. 31 Seeckt pointed out that although the
Reichswehr Ministry carried out many of the functions of the old staff, such as
the study of foreign relations, he still believed that the Reichswehr could not
38
be a modern army without the reconstitution of the Great General Staff.
He
explained that its eradication and the education that it provided officers in
facing grave and comolex situations was a serious handicap to the Reichswehr'a
successfully fighting a future war. 39
The last provision that disturbed Seeckt '>'Tas that of certain modern
armaments.

Th0re '!,vas a limited policy of experimentation in forbidden weapons

abroad, especially in RUSSia, 'Jut it was certainly on a minor scale.

Hore

important was the careful cultivation of relations wPh various industries
which were secretly coordinated to an eventual rearmament.

Seeckt was

37Walter Goerlitz, ~isto:s of the German General Staff l657-l94~ trans.
Brian Battershaw (New York, 19:J3),p. 227.
38Seeckt, Reichswehr, n. 77.
39

..!E!:!."

4

p. 7 •
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extremely concerned that German industry have the built-in capacity for undertaking rearmament when the restrictions were dropped. 40 However, the treaty
was successful in keeping modern weapons from being used by the vast majority
of the Raichswehr and as the eventual rearmament under Hitler showed.
Except for complaints and the occasional attempt to circumvent the
treaty, Seeckt was bound to rebuild the German army as the Allied Military
Commission indicated. Seeckt tied the success of his work within these
limitations to the creation of a military form that was capable of organic
expansion when possible. He had to prevent a fatal passivity and stagnation
from arising in the externally weak army by conversely concentrating on its
internal worth. 4l The Reichswehr would serve the immediate needs of state
security as well as its weakened condition allowed, but even more important it
would be ready at the proper time to undergo a "transformation, extension,
enlargement, and supplementation.,,42 This, in effect, was the gigantic
conspiracy that General Fuller thought no one but himself wanted to see.

It

was the aim of the German military to rebuild an effective power instrument
for Germany even to the point of secretly violating the treaty on the four
points Seeckt found unbearable.

If these points had been conceded to the

Republic instead of to Hitler, it is conceivable that the German military
might not have been so susceptable to the Nazi propaganda and patronage.

4<>n,id. , p. 20.
4l~., p. 31.

42Ibid.
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Except for these ineffectual violations Seeckt remained committed to the
idea of fulfillment of the treaty provisions.

Because of its material

limi tations, Seeckt realized that the Reichswehr could not compete \-1ith other
armies in quantit,r, but that its hope

l~

in painstaking concentration on

achieving some kind of qualitative superiority.

The Reichswehr had to find

some substitute for material strength.
of the army

This necessity gave rise to the concept
..
of leaders (Fuhrerarmee) that is, the reliance upon an exhaustive

and never-ending training of each individual which was to be the basis for an
elite a.rm;y.

At the end of his book detailing the construction of the Reichswehl,

Seeckt concluded that even though it was badly outnumbered and poorly equipped,

..

this Fuhrerarmee had been able to salvage the essential quality of the old

army, a well-ordered professional leadership which was "able to gradually
develop itseIf out of the chaos of the post-war period.,,43
This was an extraordinary achievement in view of the required reduction of
the officer corps from forty thousand to four thousand men.

The end in view fo

Seeckt was not a recreation of the old officer corps whose members had proved
their :.;orth in the war, but to concentrate on the introduction of younger :nen,
thereby displacing experience for the required natural develonment of the new

a.rm;y.44

The new officer corps was to be siMilar to the old in essence, train-

ing, and outlook, but it would consist of a new generation who would be the

43Ibid., n. 135.
44Ibid., p.

65.
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natural representative of the old corps.45 The selection of these relatively
few men was based on many considerations primarily of a technical and
46
professional character.
But Seeckt wanted it understood that the Arrrr:r
CO'Tl.mand alone had determined in every case "rho its officers were to be so that
neither t.he government nor the 'larious political groups had been able to
infiltrate their ranks. 47 He affirmed that the corps must have a broader
48
national composition than the previous ~.
The single qualification for
consideration of an individual was his ability.

Seeckt admitted that some

political pressure had been exerted for the admission of enlisted men into
the corps, but that most of them had simply not been able to meet the
necessary educational and technical standards required, and therefore, he
concluded, a practical consideration solved a potentially significant
political question. 49
The greatest handicap in the treaty was in the education of the officer.
Hi1itary academies were not p8rmitted so that the process of training was
changed to provide for learning leadership among the troops rather than
50
military theory.
He saw this necessity of training his young officers while
actively engaged in command positions as another "spiritual bridge" to the past

45Ibid. , pp. 68-69.
46Ibid. , pp. 65-71.
47Ibid. , p. 70.
48 Ibid • , p. 66 and R9.
49Ibid. , pp. 70-71.
50Ibid., p. 73.
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when the Prussian army in Napoleonic ti.rnes was also severly' limited as to
number and training. 5l However, he expressed a certain doubt as to the quality
of decisions officers trained in this way might make in a future war. 52
The military clauses of the treaty also set the enlistment of the troops
at twelve years and even provided for the yearly' percentage of discharges.

As

a result, Seeckt pointed out, the smallest number of men possible would
receive military training and the building of aQ1 kind of reserve was
impossible.

The short length of service made it impossible to make a career

out of the arm1 but long enough to discourage aQ10ne of ability.

To overcome

this handicap, Seeckt decided to emphasize both the appeal of belonging to an
elite group and the value of good comradeshiP.53
His ideas on military training were particularly well thought out and he
treated them at length in his chapter on the troops.
three areas:

education, drill, and disCipline.

create the independent, self-reliant person.

He divided training into

The f,oal of education was to

Drill was the means to obtain an

automatic reaction to routine tasks so as to leave the mind free for more
matters. And lastly discipline was the strengthening of the will to
carry out aims. 54 The relationship of these three, he wrote, is that, "drill
in~ortant

helps during a moment of the will's weakness, until education regains control

51Ibid., p. 74.
52Ibid.
53Ibid., p. 94.
54Ibid., Pp. 100-102.
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of discipline. u55 This stands in sharp contrast to the popular notion ot
German military training, the so-called Kadgvergehorsam (corpse-like obedience)
Since Seeckt's avowed purpose was raising the quality of his small army to
offset its material weakness, his emphasis on the individual soldier's
intelligence was sincere.

In the eight pages he devoted to the training of the

soldier, five concern education of the individual's capabilities.

The basis of

education he believed was the awakening of the person to the ideals of the
spirit and his own dignity and capabilities.

Formal education was necessarYi

Seeckt believed to fill in gaps in the soldier's background and would have
56
direct benefit for the quality of the Reichswehr.
The twelve year enlistment meant that training would not have any limited
goal but would be diversified in all aspects of militar,y skills so that the
result would be an ar~ of elite troops.57 Further there was developed the
concept of double training:

to be trained and then to train others. 58

The men

who were discharged atter twelve years of this intensive formation would be
able to train recruits, lead a future national army or militia, or serve as
front line reserve soldiers. 59 The Fuhrerarmee principle extended then to the
rank and file and beyond to encompass the entire nation.

55 Ibid ., p. 101.
56Ibid., pp. 106-107.
57~., p. 96.

58 Ibid • , p. 99.
59Ibid., p. 100.

This diversified
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training

progra~

gave each man extraordinar,y flexibility, and, in Seeckt's

opinion, gave the Reichswehr the required quality to c'JIIlpensate for its small
60
numbers.
Seeckt believed in the universal soldier, a man tra.ined in all
branches of the arrt\V but specializing in one.
modern weapons had made them
~

L~possibly

Al though the development of

complicated, he saw the advantage of an

of such universal soldiers, which, qy knowing at first hand the efficacy

of all these various weapons, would be able to cooperate in the most effective
61
manner.
Actual training ,vas hampered by the various prohibitions of the treaty and
Seeckt did not believe that the Reichswehr could profit very much from
theoretical studies of forbidden weapons.

The study of abstract theory could

not provide forbidden weapons nor the lrnowledge to use th~;m in the event of an
62
.
attack.
And worst of all he cited the destruction of the armament industry
which would take such a lonq, time to retool and catch up to modern develop63
ments.
He ridiculed the necessit,y of trying to train men with make-believe
substitutes for real weapons.

No soldier, he said, would be prepared for a

tank rolling over the border if he was only used to nl~ying with pasteboard
64
replicas.
And there were many features of modern warfare for wh:i.ch no

6OJ:bid. , n. 109.
61Ibid. , p. 110.
62 Ibid • , P. 120.

-

63Ibid. , n. 119.
64Ibid • , p. 112.
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subst.itutes could be used and ...hich cr;uld not be studted even theoretically,
such as the airplane. 65
There v.ler(! areas undisturbed by the treaty.

The engineers although

forbidden certain fixed fortifications could be trained for the erection of
66
mobile defense positions.
In actual fact, perhaps because of the tceaty,
they became expert in the development of demolition techniques.
Corps

l'Tas

The Signal

completely free to adapt and im'!1rove the technical science of

oommunj.cations which v.las.

,,0 vi tal to successful operations.

67

The infantry

al though l-Teakened in numbers and 'veapons was still the basic force of the

Reichswehr and its value Has unimpaired by the treaty because the Reichswehr
had been so caref'll to cultivate the individual soldier's education and
spirit.

68

He was not at all distrubed by the large proportion of cavalry units
imposed by the treaty.

It ~.. as obviously the intention of the allies to thereby

weaken the Reichswehr by dissipating its numbers with a military branch that
had been proved unsuitable for modern warfare. 69

Seeckt ,justified his

acceptance of the imposition of cavalry by maintaining that the Reichswehr
70
would offset the enemy's offensive fire pOHer ",i th a defensive mobility.

65Ibid., pp. 112-113.

66 Ibid., p. 121.
67Ibid., pp. 121-122.

68 Ibid ., Dp. 113-115.
69Alfred Vagts,

!

History

2.!

70Seeckt, Reichswehr, p. 114.

>1ilitarism (New York, 1959), p. 230.
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He believed that ,just as technological innovations such as the machine gun had
replaced the cavalry, in the sameY-lay, the motor would restore mobility. 71
However, the Reichswehr tvould continue to employ the horse because its use in
rough terrain could never be displaced by the motor.

The cavalry, with horse

and motorized units, are necessary for decisive movements of men and arms and
was valued by him as the most balanced branch of the small mobile ~.72
He argued that mounted troops remain necessary because of their abilit,r to
gather and disperse quickly, their value for reconnaissance purposes, their
usefulness in the fluid opening days of a war, especially for the defender, and
the educational value for the men trained in such units. 73
In writing of the value of motorized units in the transportation corps he
mentioned that the improvements of science would eventually bring about the
74
complete motorization of the entire army of the future.
However, he warned
that theorizing about it, before science made it actually possible, was
dangerous to its being correctly employed when the time came. 75 Instead, he
believed that the Reichswehr should

close attention to the militar,y
76
experiments conducted along these lines by foreign armies.
Although his

71Ibid., p. 115.

-

72Ibid., pp. 116-118.
.

73Seeckt, Moltke, p. 156.
74Seeckt, Reichswehr, p. 124.

76 Ibid .,
-

75Ibid., pp. 124-125.
D.

126.

p~
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sympathies ,-lere for the horse, he was well aware and responsive to the military
uses of technology.

lie obviously did nat forsee that technical improveMents

would come so rapidly.

The

~pe

of leadership he gave to the Reichswehr is

shown by the fact that he al101fred those young officers such as Guderian to
77
interest themselves in the study of motorized tactics.
Seeckt's second aim that he had set himself was to construct an army that
could be enlarged and modernized instantly either when the treaty restrictions
were ended or as the result of an invasion.

Some of the featt!res of this army

of the future have already been pointed out.

Hhat remains to be analysed are

the military prinCiples that governed his

th~nking

about future war.

These

theories arose fram his evaluation of the reasons for GermanY's defeat in the
world vTar and he published them in a 1930 pamphlet, Landesverteidigun,g.

His

basic concluSion was that the side with the most men and materials in anY long
conflict must ultimately be the victor. 78 This was to be the fundamental
consideration for any military planning for German security.
Seeckt had often pointed out the Reich's obvious lack of resources,
population, an d military allies.

Consequently, the first aim of German defense

in any future war must be to reach the fastest possible decision against the
79
enemy.
Such had also been the plan in the l'lorld \...rar but it had failed becaUSE

77Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader

(New

York, 1952), pp. 19-21.

78Hans von Seeckt, Landesverteidigung (Berlin, 1930), p. 37.
79lli,2., p. 40.
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the carl3er army had been sacrificed in an attempt for this quick victory and
the reserves that replaced it were not of sufficient quality to achieve the
80
goal.
The resultant war of position was not because of poor military leadership but was caused by the influx of such large amounts of ;nen and materials
that the battlefield became im'l1obilized . .1.
. th a static mass.

The employment of

poorly trained mass arwies inevitably led to a loss of manoueverability and the
81
replacement of meaningful strategy with blind attrition.
Seeckt believed there ,..rere two reasons for the modern development of the
mass~.

The first was the historical growth of nationalism which demanded

the universal duty of defense qy the entire population.

The second reason was

the modern military concept of total war in which every able-bodied citizen was
expected to serve on the battlefield. 82 It was inevitable then that the mass
army would be emplqyed.

However, it failed to aChieve its purpose of total

defeat and the war ended because of exhaustion and not from annihilation upon
83
which the use of the mass army was based.
In the last war, Seeckt found that
the principle of massiveness had reached a point where it had lost all military
value.

As a result of this he formed the axiom upon which he based his

m1lit~

thought of the future, "As the mass grew larger, the greater its military and
84
spiri tual value declined. II

80Ibid ., p. 41.
81 Ibid ., pp. 42-43.

-

82 Ibid ., pp. 34-35.

-

83Ibid. , p. 35.
84l:b1,d., p. 53.
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Seeckt's military theory was formed from these considerations born of
Oermany-' s defeat in the war.

He framed the major military problems of his tim

in the irreconcilable terms of quantity and quality and this became his
principle of action for the formation of the Reichswehr as an army of soldiers
whose capabilities would overcome larger numbers.
He saw further that the consequent reduction of quality resulting from th
mass

ar~

is further deteriorated by the intensification of technical develop-

ments in armaments.

Total warfare degenerated he felt into a struggle of

material in which the low value of the individual soldier is indicated by the
use of new weapons, such as airpower, which demand mass targets. 8S He was
obviously shocked by the slaughter he had seen on the Eastern Front where the
Russians had valued their weapons more highly than their soldiers.
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He

admitted that the mass army which is based on the practicality of short term
training of vast numbers of men was possible in the nineteenth century with
its relatively simple weapoIU7, but that technology made such an army
unthinkable in modern times because of the invention of highly complicated
and specialized equipment and their rapid replacement.

87

He concluded from

this that the better the quality or war materials, the greater the quality
demanded .r the man using them.

Large numbers of superficially trained, short

term conscripts could not take the place of the less numerous career soldiers'

8S~., p.

36.

86Ibid ., p. 64.
87~., pp. 46-47.
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professional skill.

"In this conflict between quality and quantity we must

come to the conclusion that improved techniques and complicated weapons
increase the claims based upon the soldier's value, and not to the false
88
conclusion that they can replace his declining worth."
From this analysis of these and other factors in the defeat of Germany,
Seeckt drew nine conclusions and stated them in the form of principles which
could guide the future deve lopment of the Reichswehr. Because they reveal a
theoretical soundness of his military ability in the light of the events of
the Second World War, the following is their abbreviated enumeration:

1) when

a quick victory fails, the resulting long duration brings heavy losses for all
sidesJ 2) the final outcome results not from military successes but through
the slow pressure of military, technical, commercial, and political superiorit J

3) after the first committment of men and materials, there must be a decline
in their quality and an increase in their number; 4) military operations must
be handled by a general in the field, but in this he is seriously hindered by

the large masses of poor quality; 5) in the struggle between man and the
machine, the machine must always be the victor; 6) modern war has taken on a
complicated form for which a short period of training no longer suffices; 7)
the leaders more than the front line soldiers need exhaustive training in
modern weapons technique; 8) modern war demands a long and intensive knowledge
of military thought and discipline; 9) it is impossible that a large national
army be able to maintain over a long period of time the martial spirit which

88~., p. 48.
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is the basis of victory.

89

Seeckt held that future military strategy must be devoted to the attainment of victory by a small, highly-trained force capable of achieving a
decision before the masses are set in motion. 90 In holding this view, however
he did not in any way renounce the right of Germany to build a national army
(Volksheer). The Volksbeer was very necessary as a secondary line of defense
if the regular

ar~

should fail in its objective.

91

Although the treaty

outlawed universal military training, Seeckt insisted that the citizen of a
state has the moral obligation of patriotism which meant to defend his
country. Hewever, he cautiously made a distinction between the duty of
defense (Wehrpflicht) and actual partiCipation in the armed forces
(Dienstpflicht), pointing out that the latter was only one of the ways of
implementing the former.

92

He wrote, "The inner worth of the army has suffered both militarily and
morally with its enlargement by means of universal conscription. n93 This
esteem for quality did not mean that he thereby underestimated the role of
numbers in modern warfare. Germany, he believed, must have a national
conscript army- (Volksheer) but it would be completely separate from the small

89Ibid." pp. 64-67.
90Ibid ., p. 69.
9l~., p. 70.
92Seeckt" Reicbswehr" p. 38.

93Seeckt, LandesverteidiSU!ll, p. 44.

II
,

103

regular army so as not to impede its high quality.94

Seeckt spoke of the

Reichswehr as the cadre for the Volksheer and by this he meant that those
discharged from the professional army would serve as the leaders of the
national conscripted force. 95
The role of the Volksheer in a war was seen by Seeckt as protecting the
nation's territory while the regular army was engaged in the task of defeating
96
the aggressor.
Besides its military role it also served the state in a
political way by keeping the entire populace aware of the necessity of perhaps
being called upon one day to fulfill his patriotic duty to defend his
country.97 Because their mission is different the Volksheer was not trained
in the same manner as the regular army, but rather the national purpose of
98
patriotism would be stressed.
As a military man who believed that war was inevitable, Seeckt worked
against great limitations to ensure Germany's survival in it.

Because he

believed in the bankruptcy of total war, he concentrated his thinking of
future conflicts in terms of making possible the swift victory by an elite
force.

It is not too diffioult to see in this the line of thinking that

',1,1

94Seeckt, Reichswehr, p. 43.

95~., pp. 28-29 and 45.
96seeckt, Landesverteidigung, p. 78.
97~., p. 78.

98~., p. 81.
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resulted in the Blitzkrieg.

But he did not see that another war of position

was unlikely because of the mobility that the motor would provide.

Nor did

he realize that the motor would make mass armies mobile on a scale never
imagined before.

But as a military prophet he would score higher than most

of his contemporaries.
principle.

He may have underestimated the tank, but not its

There can be no doubt that Seeckt did his work well and that the

limitations of the treaty did not achieve their purpose.

CHAPTER V

THE mWOLITICAL ARMY

The international tensions following the Second World War and the rapid
progress of weapons technology have shown how close the interaction between
political and militar,r arfairs may become.

The question of their proper

relationship in the formulation of policy is common to every form of government and becomes particularly dynamic in times of crisis when the state
depends for its security upon a military response. An examination of Seeckt's
political thought must determine what function he claimed for the military in
the troubled life ot the Weimar Republic.

The various aspects ot this

military-political relationship contained in his published work were the
position of the army within the state, its relations with the government, the
parties, and the nation, its part in the determination and execution of state
policy, and the relative importance of military factors in political
decisions.

Some significant events in his career related to these ideas will

also be considered.
Seeckt's conception of the military's role in the state was well defined
and his various statements in regard to it were consistent with his actions.
He saw the basic relationship between state and military affairs in terms ot
the interdependence or the part to the whole. He described the military as
a state institution, influenced by the state policies, and having direct
105
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political functions. l

He defined the political functions founded in the

nature of the armed forces as being first, the executive arm for the defense
of the Reich from its external and, if necessary, its internal enemies,
second, the agency which enabled the state to speak from a·position of power
in its foreign affairs, and third, the model and promoter of national unity,
order, and discipline. 2 These three :functions, related respectively to the
Reich, the state, and the nation, have already been considered in general,
but the precise mission of the military within the state's structure remains
to be developed.
There was no doubt in any of Seeckt's writings that he acknowledged the
army as a dependent of the state and subject to its aims. He agreed with
Clausewitz that, ItThe army, in accordance with its nature, becomes the first
servant of the state, of which it is a part. 1t3 No more unequivocal
expression of the priority of state rather than military aims could be found
than his assertion, "It cannot be denied that military questions always stand
in the closest relationship with political policies, which the soldier will
follow in all planning, in all organizational matters, and also in the
conduct of war, including its preparation, execution, and conclusion.,,4

lHans von Seeckt, Moltke,

~

Vorbild (Berlin, 1931), p. 109.

2Hans von Seeckt, The Future of the German ~mpire, Criticisms and
Postulates, trans. Oakley WilliamstLondon, 1930 , pp. 13$-137.
3Hans von Seeckt, Thoughts
(London, 1930), ,po 78.

£f. !

Soldier, trans. Gilbert Waterhouse

4lIans von Seeckt, Landesverteidigung (Berlin, 1930), p. 17.
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Seeckt did not believe that the army existed for itself but found its reason
for being

on~

in a political context.

However, this subserviance of the military to political interests was of
an unusual kind. To carry out the political goals of the state, the army must
,

form a special body within the state. He explained that, "The army has its
own vital conditions, quite peculiar to itself, and a character distinguishing
it from all other Stats institutions:

th3se traits have to be taken into

account if the army is not to become a state within the State, but a
reflection of the State."

5

This exceptional relationship consisted in the

army's existence as an autonomous organization having the state's complete
confidence in its ability and loyalty.6
Seeckt emphasized the ambiguity of such a position when he wrote that,
"'!'he arIr\Y should become a state within the state, but it should be lIBrged in
the state through service; in fact, it should itself become the purest image

ot the state. II7 It is of fundamental importance to understand what he meant
by this since the words "state within the state" are often quoted in
connection with his political outlook.
This remark is not inconsistent with his other statements. As the last
part ot the sentence indicated, it was intended as a dramatic expression ot
the type of interdependence which characterized the military as a political

5Seeckt, Future 2!. Empire, p. 138.
6~.J p. 139.

7Seeckt, Thoughts, p. 77.
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institution. He explained that the army must be separated from the shifting,
day-to-dq- bickering of party politics in order to remain strong and united to
serve the interests of the state. 8 Freed from such interference to carry on
its military duties, the

ar~

would be able to execute state policy whole-

heartedly and without reservation.
became identioal with the state.
seotion by writing,

t~e

In this way the military and its aims
It was in this sense that he concluded this

army serves the state and the state alone, for it is

the state. ,,9 The link that bound the two inseparably together was the
commonweal whioh they both served.
ar~

Seeckt never entertained the idea that the

was an organization with its own aims separate from those of the state.
The key to understanding how Seeckt envisioned this as working out in

practice oan be found in his distinotion between the Reich on the one hand,
and the state, government, and political parties on the other.
the state as the political embodiment of the Reich.

He considered

It was to the Reioh and

its politioal expression, the state, that the military owed strictest
allegiance and loyalty.

When Seeokt spoke of the army as serving "the state

and the state alone lt it was in this sense of Reich.

The form of state and its

government were variable factors in the development of the Reich. But as long
as they represented the Reioh, the military was bound in duty to them.
The Reiohswehr took an oath to the oonstitution and, although this might

8~., p. 18-19.
9Ibid., p. 80.
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not be an inspiration to duty, Seeckt never questioned its legal force.

This

matter of the oath was important to him because it constituted the legitimacy
of the political and military hierarchy.

Seeckt recalled nostagically how

simple the question of obedience had been when the soldier took a personal
oath to the Kaiser and being loyal had meant following imperial orders. 10 In
Seeckt's mind, the Republic could never command such unquestioned submission
since parliamentary government was factional and divided. Consequently he
regarded the matter of loyalty to the t'leimar authorities as much more complex
than to the Kaiser who had been the personal embodiment of the Reich's wide
variety of interests. Seeckt believed the Republic and its party system did
away with the identification of the ruler with the Reich in which the officer
had founded his allegiance.

He thought that the state was "too cold" a

concept for the soldier to serve and that "the constitution, which a
parliament could change at any moment by a two-thirds majority, was not
suitable for the foundation of an inner committment."

11

His solution for the

Reichswehr was that the officer base his loyalty in "the personal, bard-earned
conception of the duty due to the Fatherland and the voluntary acceptance of
subordination because of his recognition of this. ,,12 Such was Seeckt' s moral
solution to the problem of serving the Reich atter 1918 J and this reveals more

10Seeckt, Moltke, p. 168.
llHans von Seeckt,
12Ibid •

E!.! Reichswshr

(Leipzig, 1933), p. 67.
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than anything else the estrangement of the Reichswehr from the Republic and
ita leadership.
The relation of the military to the state which met the qualification of
representing the whole nation was clear in Seeckt's mind.

Matters of policy

were determined by the state leader who imposed his decisions upon the
military. 13 The military on its part had needs and demands which the statesman must fit into the general framework of the state's policy.14 If, however,
such demands were rejected for reasons of policy then the military must
accede, and Seeckt emphasized that directly military matters, such as
organization, armaments, and training, were not outside the scope of state
policy and could not be limited to purely military decisions.

15

This is a

clear affirmation that the military was to be subservient to the directing wil
of the statesman and that political decisions take precedence over military
considerations •
However, Seeckt did not believe that this relieved the military commander
of his own responsibility.

In matters of military competency, he must

champion his own judgments, although the final decision was even here made by
the political leadership.

In such conflicts over judgments of a militarily

technical nature, resignation rather than insubordination was expected of the
officer.

Seeckt cited the conflict between Bismarck and Moltke over the

l~ von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten (Berlin, 1929), p. 56.
14Ibid., p.

-

l'Ibid.

57.
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bombardment of Paris as an example of military responsibility. 16 To Seeckt
there was no question that blind obedience was unworthy of an officer.

In

another connection he wrote, "We hear a lot about leadership and the leader's
responsibility, just as if the responsibility of the led were thereby wiped
out.

No less sense of responsibility attaches to the obeying than to the

giving of orders.

The fool is without any sense of responsibility; so is the

slave.,,11
Seeckt believed that ultimate responsibility for the employment of the
military rested upon the political leader.

"Wars are not made by soldiers,

but by statesmen • • • and the figures of Cromwell, Frederick the Great> and
Napoleon, under whom the field army executed the will of the statesman, offer
18
no contradiction."
But the military leaders must also be aware of the
reasons and aims for what they are required to do.

"It is not enough for the

field commander to be a good soldier J he must also be at home in the fields
of domestic and foreign politiCS, for he draws his strength from domestic
policies, and his victories or defeats are matters which have political
effects. n19
His selection of Cromwell and Napoleon show how close he considered the
association between the political and military spheres and his conviction

16seeckt, Moltke, p. 131.
11Seeckt, Future

2!. Empire,

p. 26.

18Seeckt, Landesverteidi~nj, p. 91.
19Ibid., p. 10.
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20

that the "highest and purest type of field connnander is the royal commander."
This was so, he said, because the king incorporated "the state's

~_a:tson ~'etre

and was able to coordinate his military and political policies perfectly
21
thereby achieving the optimum results.
He realized that the end of the
monarchy meant the severance of this intimate union between the two spheres,
but he continued to believe that, "The more the political leader unites himself with the commander in the field, the nearer will he come to the ideal of
the royal command.er. 1I22 Seeckt's monarchism was at least partly based on this
consideration that the effective Power State must have a close militarypolitical relationship.
Seeckt's soldier-ruler was neither an amateur general nor an irresponsibl
visionary. Alexander, he considered the greatest example of a political
commander whose exploits were "no adventure, but followed an intuitive plan,
as only genius fashions it.,,23 On the other hand, Napoleon was a creature of
his period in history, a romantic adventurer for whom one aimless victory
could only lead to another until ultimate defeat. 24 The reason that Seeckt
denied Napoleon greatness while granting it to Alexander was that, although
their work of empire was similar) and though Alexander's general aim was

20Hans von Seeckt, Antikes Feldherrntum (Berlin) 1929), p. 8.
21~., pp. 8-9.

22Ibid., p. 9.
23ill!!., p. 17.
24Ibid ., p. 33-34.
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not clear, yet "at no moment in his undertakings do we have the teeling of
uncertainty, of opportunism. n25

Seeckt's sense of responsibility allowed no

compassion for the dilettante or the dreamer, and Napoleon was scorned as a
man who allowed his sense of reality to be corrupted by his phantasies. 26
He believed that only a genius could combine military and political
leadership in a single individual and this was the reason most kings delegated
the actual military power to others more capable than they.

In fact, Seeckt

did not believe that it was entirely desirable to have a genius for a leader
because lIit is the fate of the great man of action that his work, accomplished
only through his own efforts, flourishes with him and so also vanishes with
him. n27

In his biography of Moltke, Seeokt described the ultimate failure ot

the tollowing examples of genius:

Tantalus, Alexander, Frederick II,

Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Goethe, Nietzsche, and Bismarck.

28

His

position was that as such genius was selt-destructive, unable to be imitated
because it was exoeptional, "a singular phenomenon which haa had no ancestors
29
and can have no followers."
He believed that this was for the best because
geniu8 was amoral, making its own law trom its inner necessity and its good
was only good for it.3° It was fortunate then that it could not engender

25~., pp.

17-18.

26Ibid., p. 33.
27~., p.

27.

28S eeckt, Moltke, 13.
29Ibid., p.

30

14.
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successors because the world needed order and tranquility based on mass morals
(Massenmoral).31 It was better, he concluded, for leaders to have talent
(~)

grow.

32

than genius because talent had a pattern that could develop and
And he designated the Great General Starf as a good example of talent

because it

successful~

educated the average man and was not ooncerned with

the genius}3 Seeckt's ideal of military leadership was a talented general
who worked within the political direction of the state leadership. He had no
desire to unite the two in a single personality and was certainly aware of the
future dangers such a development might bring.
Although Seeckt did not absolutely deny the possibility of direct
civilian direction of the

~,

it was entirely contrary to his concept of the

correct relationship between the two in which political decisions of policy
would be carried out by the subordinate military leader as he thought best.
This independence of action and the special position of the

ar~

within the

state presupposed that the military would have a point of view on policy and
that it would be allowed to express it by means of its political liaison, the
Reichswehr Hinistry.

He made a clear presentation of what he conceived as

the role of the army in politics in the following:
The army is the basis of the state's power and its most mighty weapon.
It must be prepared for its employment at any moment. This it cannot
do if its leadership remains without knowledge of the internal

31lbid., p. 14.
32 Thid •

-

33Th
--M., p. 33.
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political situation and without influence on it. It can quite
suddenly be presented with an insoluable problem. The demand
that the army be kept outside of politics is unquestionably
correct, if by this is understood, that the army, therefore the
individual soldier, has no influence in administrative measures
or in any parliamentary matter, as well as being kept aloof from
party motives. This principle of the unpolitical army should not
however be so interpreted, that the leadership of the army, therefore the Reichswehr Ministry, is kept uninformed of the development
of state policy. The army desires to exercise its authorized
influence on policy, for which end it nmst possess knowledge about
it, in order to form by itself its own opinion. Therefore, it must
also educate and develop its capacity for the study of policy and
thereby add a broader perspective to its other tasks.34
Seeckt's view of the Reichswehr Ministry was that it was a military
department within the state apparatus whose function was to keep the

ar~

leadership informed of political policy and in turn to inform the government
of the military's view of state policy)'

In addition to this task, the

Reichswehr Ministry did part of the work of the Great General Staff such as
the gathering of foreign military intelligence, higher military education, and
the stuq, of domestic economic and social conditions.)6 In the three pages
dealing with the Ministry, Seeckt Showed no recognition of the position of the
Reichswehr Minister in making military policy or as the civilian head of the
army.
The army was a subordinate but special part of the state.

Seeckt

acknowledged in theory the primacy of the political over the military.

He als

stressed the tact that. the &rJIlY' needed to be commanded by military men in

J4seeckt, !.t!tichswehr, p.
35Ibid.

-

36~., pp.

77-78 •

79.
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order to be the effective executive arm of the state. He nowhere explicitly
developed the manner in which the Reich President replaoed the Kaiser as
Supreme War IDrd.

But from what he wrote concerning military direotion by

politioal leaders, he was not anxious to have a civilian head of government
involved in military operations. 31 He believed that the practical relationshi
between the state and military leaders was one of olose oooperation in working
38
together for a oommon goal.
In his book on Moltke, Seeckt showed how much
39
cooperation had worked in the case of Bismarok and his ohief of staff.
Seeoktts main point was that Bismarok's sucoess was possible only
through the planning of Maltke.

This was true, he said, because all military

planning must be based on political considerations and take into aooount the
situation and aims of the state. 40 In the case of Bismarck, it was Moltke who
provided the neoessary information of what was possible for Prussia militarily
and henoe, politically.

41

Because of Moltke's understanding of the political

implioations of his military strategy he allowed Bismarck the opportunity to
change his decisions in regard to policy aims. Seeckt wrote of this that,
"Bismarok, with his will of genius, followed the deadly, steel-hard energy of

31Seeokt, Gedanken, p. 64 •
38~., p. 63.

39Saeckt , Maltke, pp. 110-144.
40Ibid ., p. 111.

41Ibid ., p.

123.
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Moltke to victory."

42

Seeckt saw in this cooperation "the greatest example

of how the military commander committed to the state's aims must add to the
directing will of the statesman, so that both uphold the same energy of
action. tt43 He concluded his study of their relationship by pointing out two
principles:

first, the military must keep the statesman informed about

military considerations that have a bearing on state policy, and second,
although the statesman decided policy, the military must be free to decide on
question of strategy. 44

The second point reaffirms Seeckt I s be lief that the

army must be commanded by the military.
If Seeckt's understanding of the government's control of the army was
rather tenuous, his attitude towards the political parties and the military
was directly to the point.

He believed that the army would compromise its

very nature and organization i f it
than to the Reich.

we~e

to have political committments other

For that reason soldiers were not to be affiliated with

any political association nor did they have the right to

vote~5

In the matter

of the various parties, the military had no preferenoe, but they could not
accept in their ranks those who came from parties which exhibited "an antistate sentiment.,,46

It was in this sense of isolation from party politics,

that Seeckt conoeived of the army as being completely unpolitical.

42~., p. llB.

43~., p. 120.

-

44Ibid., pp. 141-142.
45Seeckt , Reichswehr, p. 9B.
46Ibid.
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From these theoretical considerations of Seecktfs thought it is now
possible to examine the motivation behind some of his actions.

The first of

these was his refusal to approve the government decision to use force to
crush the Kapp Putsch of March 13, 1920. At the meeting called by Noske, the
Reichswehr Minister, only Reinhardt .. the Chief of the Army Command, backed the
government position. Seeckt, speaking for the other officers present ..
opposed the use of the Reichswehr against the various military units that had
declared for the insurgents, remarking that, "Soldiers do not fire upon
soldiers .tt47 Learning that the generals disapproved the use of force against
the rebels, the government left Berlin to the Kappists who found the civil
service and the officers of the Army Command unwilling to cooperate with them.
The solidarity of the general strike brought about the end of the Putseh in
four days.
In the whole affair Seeckt was motivated by his theoretical consideration
of the necessity of maintaining the German army as strong and undivided.

The

use of the Reichswehr to fire on their fellow soldiers, mostly Freikorps
units being mustered out of the Provisional Reichswehr would have had
disuteroul effects on later. discipline. There Were also two practical
factors in his decision. One was his uncertainty of the discipline of the
troops during a period of unsure legality in which comm.ands of the rebel
military authorities might appear to have legitimacy.
situation correctly because many officers became

47Friedrich von Rabenau.
1940), p. 221.

Seeckt assessed the

utter~

confused about whose

Seeckt. ~ seinem Leben 1918-1936 (Leipzig,
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orders to follow, some switching sides several times. 48 The second factor was
that Seeckt could not be sure whether the loyal troops, in the midst of their
reorganization into the new units of the R.eichswehr, were a match for the
compact and proved Freikorps which made up the bulk of the Kappist forces. 49
Such were the reasons for Seeckt's opposition to Noske's plan of military
resistance. His actions after this decision do not indicate

a~

disloyalty

to Ebert's legitimate government nor anything but disapproval of the rebels.

His view of the means to quell the Putsch did not coincide with that of his
superior, Noske, and hence, after ordering his subordinates not to follow the
commands of the Kappists, he formally resigned. 50 He then offered his
service and influence to Ebert's representative in Berlin who, after the
collapse of the

~tsch,

chose him to take charge of the confused military

situation as acting chief of the Army Command.'l
Seeckt had remained loyal to hi8 constitutional oath and he was
convinced that the military leaders who backed the Putsch were guilty of
treason. But his decision was primarily dictated by considerations of
military unity and, even if the chances of defeating the Kappists had been
much better, it is doubtful whether he would have been for military intervention which would have affected the future army adversely.

Ch-anted the

48Harold J. Gordon, Jr., The Reichswehr and the German Re~blic 19191926 (Princeton, New Jersey, l~), pp. tjO-lli'O: 49Rabenau, Seeckt, p. 2.34.
50a0rdon, Reichswehr, p. 118.
51Ibid., p. 125.
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unsettled conditions of the embryo Reichswehr and the necessity of fashioning
an unified organization out of a badly demoralized group of fighting men, it
is difficult to imagine another alternative other than avoiding fratricidal
warfare.
Such considerations of unity are not limited to one military system, but
are a part ot military thought.

During the troubles that preceded Charles de

Gaulle's assumption of power, part of the military became discontented with
the authorities of the Fourth Republic.

When the army in Algeria involved

itself in a revolution against the Paris government, General Ely, although
personally opposed to the motives and actions of the rebels, "resigned as
Chief of Staft rather than issue an order calling upon units in France to
oppose their brothers soldiers from Algeria. ,,52

In the case of the Reichswehr

there was even more reason for such a course of action since the solidarity

ot the young army was just being tormed in its transition from the newly
prohibited Provisional Reichswshr.
Seeckt's ideas on the separation ot the military from party politics was
shown at the time ot his first proclamation to the Otticer Corps in which he
drew the lessons ot the Kapp Putsch.

He reminded them that "the soldier

stands true to his constitutional duty" and treasonable activities" on the
part ot the military stemmed trom political shortsightedness" which would only
lead to politicians intertering in army aftairs.

5.3 The burden ot the address

52!!!! Magazine (February 2.3, 1958).
53Edgar von Schr.lidt-Pauli, General v. Seeckt:
deutschen Soldaten (Berlin, 19.37), pp. 90-97.
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was that the new Reichswehr was on trial and must give no justification for
54
such intervention.
The tone of his remarks would seem to indicate that
Seeckt had a real fear that this might happen.
The case of the 1923 Munich Putsch was entirely different from that of
Kapp.

First of all, it was bound up with Bavarian separatism whose aim was

to destroy the unity of the Reich, something Seeckt had always opposed.
Secondly, he was certain as to the loyalty of a tightly unified army_

Lastly,

there was involved the question of internal army discipline in General von
1&ssow 1 s direct refusal of an order. For all these reasons, Seeckt from the
beginning of the trouble in Bavaria determined upon a policy of immediate use
of force and, in fact, was over-ruled by the government, an ironic reversal
of their previous roles. 55
"The Reichswehr stands behind me" was a remark Seeckt made in answer to
Ebert's question of the army's political loyalty.

This statement has been

often quoted as an indication of Seeckt 1s political power.

Seeckt in 1936

gave the following explanation to a fellow officer:
" ••• Ebert knew ot the attempts of Rightist circles to make the
Reichswehr their party army, while he was being pressed by his
people to influence it in favor of the Social Democrats. He
asked me how I stood on this question. I sharply rejected both
influences, whereupon he asked me, excitedly: Behind whom then
did the Reichswehr really stand? My answer was: 'The Reichswehr
stands behind me.' "56

54Ibid.
5500r don, ~iChswehr, p. 239.

..

56Ibid., pp. 278-279 quoted from the Seeckt Papers, Stuck 278.
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The implication of the statement is clearly one of military discipline over
party politics within the army.

It does not contradict any of his many state-

ments as to the military's duty of obedience to the state nor does it change
the limitations he put on the autonomy of the military or its role in
influencing policy.
There is also the question of Seeckt's own political ambitions while on
active duty. On November 2, 1923, after tmlch urging by his associates, he
came to the conclusion that the only way to save the Reich from perpetual
disunity was for him to become Chancellor, dictator" or member of a
directory.57 The following day he called on Ebert and then returned to tell
his friends that the time was not ripe for him to take power "or ganically .1158

After this he often considered the idea of running as an independent for
President but he was realistic enough to know that he had no mass a.ppeal. 59

In 1924 he decided to seek the Presidential nomination of the conservative
parties at the end of Ebert's term of office, but the premature death of the
President ended all of his plans of becoming head of state. 60 These thoughts
seem to have been prompted by his belief that he alone was the man who could
save Germany from continual crisis. He was motivated by good intentions, as

57Rabenau, Seeckt, pp. 363-365.

58~., p. 364.
59Ibid ., p. 386.
60Ibid ., pp. 413-414.
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his visit to Ebert demonstrated, but he violated his own regulations concerning political activities by members of the army.

It does not appear that he

pursued his quest for political power too seriously and a remark made about
him at the time was that he was one of the many military leaders who "having
61
at last reached the Rubicon, simply sit down on its banks and fish."
Seeckt's attitude to Hitler's National Socialist Party is not entirely
clear.

His biography, published during the war, naturally contained no anti-

Hitler material.

However, while one illustration pictured the two smiling

happily at an army review, it oould not have been an accident that another
showed Seeckt and General werner von Fritsch wbo was disgraced by Rimmler in
1938.

Seeckt's first meeting with Himmler was March 12, 1923 wben Ritler

promised that the SA (Sturmabteilun,> would never figbt the Reicbswerb. 62
Rabenau gave a tactual presentation of tbe Munich Putsch emphasizing Kabr' s
role.

Seeckt had a meeting with Hitler in 1931 in which he agreed about his

goals but not about tbe means ot obtaining them .. 63

In 1932 he advised his

sister to vote tor Hitler rather than Hindenburg. 64 other than that there is
no direct evidence of his relations with Hitler.

From April 1933 to 1935 he

was outside Germany and Rabenau presents none ot the ideas he must have had
about certain ot Hitler's activities.

This silence in his biography makes

61Ernst von Salomon, The Answers ot Ernst von Salomon (London 1954), p.
242.
62Rabenau, Seeckt, p. 347.
6)~., p. 660.

64Ibid., p.

665.
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obvious his criticism, the only kind possible in a dictatorship.
Many of Hitler's aims may have been identical with Seeckt's objectives:
a unified nation in a centralized Reich, the substitution of a national party
for parliamentary government, the abrogation of the peace treaty, the
creation of a power:t'ul national arnw, the resumption of a philosophy of force
in a Power State. And yet Hitler, as a leader, represented much that Seeckt
time and again in his writings condemned:

opportunist, dilettante, politician

dreamer, scoundrel. Seeckt must have been shaken, for instance, by the Purge
of 1934, in which some of the leading figures who had taken a part in crushing
Hitler's Putsch in 1923, were assassinated out of revenge. Even though the
Purge ostensibly represented the end of the SA as a military organization,
its lack of discipline and clear illegality must have been abhorent to a man
such as Seeckt.

It is surprising that German officers did not earlier than

1944 follow his distinction between party, state, and Reich, although there
was the example of General Indwig Beck's resignation in 1938 as Chief of

Starf.

Perhaps the best indication of Seeckt's thought as it applied to

National Socialism is the fact that General Rabenau, his devoted pupil, took
part in the Officers' Plot of July 20, 1944 against Hitler and was executed
65
for it.
It would be an oversimplification to label Seeckt's political thought as
militaristic. What seems to be its point of divergence from other military

65Gerhard Ritter, The German Resistance: Carl Goerdeler's Stru,~le
Against Tyranny, trans. R. T. CWl( (New York l~, pp. 92-93and 2 •
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systems was his insistence upon the special separateness of the
other political agencies of the state.

ar~

from

It would appear that this was

dictated by his fear that the Reichswehr would be fragmented by the divisiveness which he considered the congenital disease of parliamentary politics.
He was determined that military personnel would have nothing to do with the
struggle of the various politioal parties and political neutrality became a
policy of isolation from the struggles of the young Republio.

The individual

offioer became a politioal specialist insensitive to the domestic political
difficulties of the republican government.
attempt to make the
in its problems.

ar~

Such was the result of Seecktts

a vital part of the Reich without active participatio

There may have been other, less dangerous alternatives for

the creation of a strong defense force under the treaty restrictions.

But

Seeckt's political thought impelled him to take the course he did. Hans
Guderian, one of the men who was trained in the Reichswehr, gave a final
judgment on the outcome of Seeckt's political thought.
His struggle to keep the ar~ free from the influence of party
politics was undoubtedly correct from his point of view, it had,
however, in the long run an unfortunate result in that the Officer
Corps in general, and the future General Staff Corps offioers in
particular, were in consequence largely uneducated in matters of
internal and external politics. That was the principle weakness
of his system. 66

6~ans Guderian, Panzer Leader, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York,
1952), p. 457.
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